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ABSTRACT 
A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO NEXT GENERATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
DATA ELICITATION AND PLANNING USING SERIOUS GAMING METHODS 
Ersin Ancel 
Old Dominion University, 2011 
Director: Dr. Adrian Gheorghe 
Infrastructure systems are vital to the functioning of our society and economy. However, 
these systems are increasingly complex and are more interdependent than ever, making them 
difficult to manage. In order to respond to increasing demand, environmental concerns, and 
natural and man-made threats, infrastructure systems have to adapt and transform. Traditional 
engineering design approaches and planning tools have proven to be inadequate when planning 
and managing these complex socio-technical system transitions. The design and 
implementation of next generation infrastructure systems require holistic methodologies, 
encompassing organizational and societal aspects in addition to technical factors. In order to do 
so, a serious gaming based risk assessment methodology is developed to assist infrastructure 
data elicitation and planning. The methodology combines the use of various models, 
commercial-off-the-shelf solutions and a gaming approach to aggregate the inputs of various 
subject matter experts (SMEs) to predict future system characteristics. The serious gaming 
based approach enables experts to obtain a thorough understanding of the complexity and 
interdependency of the system while offering a platform to experiment with various strategies 
and scenarios. In order to demonstrate its abilities, the methodology was applied to National 
Airspace System (NAS) overhaul and its transformation to Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NextGen). The implemented methodology yielded a comprehensive safety assessment 
and data generation mechanism, embracing the social and technical aspects of the NAS 
transformation for the next 15 years. 
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The world is heavily dependent on various critical infrastructures in areas like 
transportation, communication, water, energy, banking and finance, etc. Critical infrastructures 
are "national infrastructures [...] so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a 
debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States"(U.S. Congressional 
Research Service, 2003, Jan. 29, pp. CRS-2). Today's critical infrastructures1 are large-scale 
systems, comprised of multiple components, involving various stakeholders, technologies, 
policies and social factors (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008; Mayer, Bockstael-Blok, & Valentin, 
2004). The interplay between the technology, users and policy makers creates the socio-
technical aspect of infrastructures. Infrastructures inherently evolve over time to address 
changing needs by adapting and evolving to new situations, often not known in advance 
(Janssen, Chun, & Gil-Garcia, 2009). In recent years, various sociotechnical systems started to 
undergo a series of transitions. The definition of system transition is given as "a long-term 
fundamental change (irreversible, high-impact and of high-magnitude) in the cultures (mental 
maps, perceptions), structures (institutions, infrastructures and markets), and practices (use of 
resources) of a societal system" (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008, p. 1). In other words, the 
transition includes "a structural change in both technical and social subsystems" (Chappin & 
Dijkema, 2008, p. 1). These transformations are mandated by increased performability, 
sustainability and environmental efficiency requirements. However, modernization of these 
This dissertation uses APA Style 
Within this dissertation infrastructures and critical infrastructures are used interchangeably 
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infrastructures is being held back for reasons besides economics (Geels, 2005). Because large 
infrastructures like power, transportation, and communication contain multi-dimensional 
complexity and are essentially stable, transforming the existing systems to more efficient 
alternatives is challenging (Roos, de Neufville, Moavenzadeh, & Connors, 2004). The need to 
comprehend infrastructures at the societal level and understand technical, political and 
economic factors' interaction becomes more and more prominent (Hansman, Magee, de 
Neufville, Robins, & Roos, 2006). 
The planning and implementation phases of such large-scale infrastructure transitions 
require close monitoring of performance parameters like safety, efficiency, and sustainability. 
Ensuring that infrastructure transition reveals a safer and more sustainable system has become 
a major challenge for society (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005; Luna-Reyes, Zhang, Gil-Garcia, & 
Cresswell, 2005). In order to do so, decision makers often need to test various strategies and 
perform analyses to characterize risk and other parameters. However, past strategies and 
historical data regarding previous infrastructure systems are no longer adequate for next 
generation infrastructure systems design because (1) previous systems evolved via incremental 
changes and system improvements which lead them to be unsustainable (i.e. congestion, energy 
shortage, air transportation delays, etc.) and (2) previous infrastructures were made to last and 
were robust but resistant to change which causes challenges (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005; 
Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008; Hansman, et al., 2006). Additionally, the increased presence of 
societal aspects in the socio-technical system structure causes complications in understanding 
and foreseeing solutions. The evolutionary nature of infrastructure systems and the ever-
changing societal dynamics make every problem essentially unique, rendering historical data 
somehow ineffective (Brewer, 2007; Janssen, et al., 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
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The lack of empirical data causes decision makers to heavily rely on expert opinions for 
next generation infrastructure planning (Chytka, Conway, & Unal, 2006). The current research 
aims to develop a systemic framework to understand socio-technical systems and develop a 
test-bed for alternative scenarios while generating data. The goal is to help collect experts' 
opinions and aggregate data regarding the future state of the system while enhancing multilevel 
complexity communication among stakeholders. For that purpose, a serious gaming based 
platform is supported by various commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) software solutions to generate 
a simulation environment. The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is used as 
a case study to demonstrate and validate the proposed methodology within the present work. 
1.2 Future's different 
Rittel and Webber (1973) state that past problems that 'professionals' (educators, housers, 
city planners, highway engineers, decision makers, etc.) solved were definable, understandable 
and consensual problems. Professionals were hired to eliminate undesirable conditions and 
reach the commonly preferred system state. Given the clear definition of the problem, during 
the 19th century, planners were able to solve issues like paving streets, connecting cities, 
eliminating dreaded diseases, delivering clean water to the majority of the population, providing 
social services to every city, etc. However, once these trivial engineering and decision making 
problems were dealt with, the more stubborn problems emerged. Besides the efficiency 
concept, equity was now being considered as a measure of accomplishment. The nation's 
pluralism and the differentiation of public values annihilate the idea of consensus. As the 
infrastructures evolved to their current states of interacting open societal systems, the 
traditional engineering design approaches tailored to solve technical issues were no longer valid 
(Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
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Besides the changing public dynamics and complexity of future systems, due to 
globalization, de-regulation, upcoming environmental concerns, and issues with the world 
economy, the future shape of infrastructures are more and more uncertain (Wenzler, 2008). 
Nowadays, each sector is facing varying degrees of discontinuous and rapid shifts in technology, 
deregulatory pressures, demand fluctuations, natural and human threats to operation, along 
with impacts of information technology on human factors, and shifting societal needs and 
expectations (Hansman, et al., 2006). The problems that businesses and organizations are facing 
are also becoming increasingly dynamic, ill-defined and complex with many variables and 
interactions. Given the reasons above, the future status of man-made systems like energy, 
transportation, warfare, agricultural or any other infrastructure cannot be predicted for 
prolonged timeframes. The next generation of infrastructure systems will be considerably 
different than the current system (Brewer, 2007). 
1.3 Next Generation Infrastructures 
A general definition of an infrastructure can be given as an essential system to the 
functioning of the economy (Bekebrede, 2010). Infrastructures include public and quasi-public 
utilities and facilities, and they are used by a large number of users (Janssen, et al., 2009). A 
more detailed description can be given as "infrastructures are facilities and their operations and 
the operating and management institutions that provide water, remove waste, facilitate 
movement of people and goods, and otherwise serve and support other economic and social 
activity or protect environmental quality (National Research Council, 1995, p. 121)." 
Infrastructure systems are viewed as socio-technical systems where hardware and software are 
the components of a more complex system, encompassing people, work processes, institutional 
and cultural factors (Luna-Reyes, et al., 2005). 
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Infrastructure systems have to evolve as performance requirements and demand 
constantly increase over time. The capacity increase coupled with better efficiency 
requirements mandate a constant modernization of infrastructure systems (Bekebrede, 2010). 
As a result, new technologies with promising capabilities were developed. Examples of these 
alternatives are the advances in nanotechnology, molecular biology, next generation energy 
sources or advancements in aviation. 
Traditional infrastructure modernization includes adding these technologies to the existing 
infrastructure. Also known as incremental innovations, this method includes conventional 
technology development that takes place at the micro-level of systems (Hansman, et al., 2006). 
In fact, most current infrastructure systems evolved via incremental innovations where the new 
technologies that are developed are the variants of the existing systems that can be 
implemented without extensive instruction or training (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005). Such 
infrastructure modernizations have been difficult, ineffective and inefficient to maintain. 
Consequently, a number of current infrastructure systems are unsustainable, showing signs of 
congestions, energy black-outs, flooding, etc (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008). It is believed that 
current infrastructure system deficiencies are related to the incremental innovation that took 
place during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005; 
Hansman, et al., 2006; Rittel & Webber, 1973). Elzen and Wieczorek argue that, instead of 
modernizing the infrastructure systems via incremental innovations, it is necessary to adopt the 
concept of "transitioning" the system which is defined as "a long-term change in an 
encompassing system that serves a basic societal function [...] where both technical as well as 
the social/cultural dimensions change drastically (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005, p. 651)." The next 
generation infrastructure systems require a systems approach, addressing the infrastructures at 
societal as well as technological levels. It is imperative to include multiple perspectives and 
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multiple disciplines in methodology development since real-world problems do not exist 
independently of their socio-technical, political, economic and psychological contexts. Hansman 
et al. pointed to the lack of rigorous methods for developing, evaluating and evolving future 
infrastructure architectures able to integrate legacy elements while also responding to new 
technologies, knowledge and demands (Brewer, 2007; Hansman, et al., 2006, p. 3). The next 
section will highlight the approach taken within this research to reach the aforementioned goal. 
1.4 The need for a New Approach 
Due to the presence of interdependency, multi-dimensional complexity (see Section 2.2.2) 
and societal factors, determining the system parameters of next generation infrastructure 
systems becomes a challenging task. Uncertainty -defined as the inability to determine the true 
state of a system caused by the lack of incomplete knowledge and random variability- is a major 
component in next generation infrastructure development (Chytka, 2003; Roos, et al., 2004). 
However, uncertainty is a much more prominent factor in large-scale infrastructure design 
versus the traditional engineering undertakings. Compared to specific engineering component 
designs (e.g. design of a power plant or a bridge) infrastructure systems (like electric power 
distribution, roadway network or internet) last longer and include more stakeholder interaction 
causing more uncertainties. Traditional engineering projects contain specific design parameters, 
mandated by clients, governmental requirements or design codes. The challenge in these 
projects is to optimize the output to meet the predetermined set of criteria. On the other hand, 
due to the presence of various competitive stakeholders, shifts in public perceptions and 
changes in the political environment affect the design requirements of infrastructure systems. 
Besides the unknown stakeholder strategies and the future political shifts, energy or 
transportation infrastructure planners are also unaware of the system-specific parameters like 
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fuel prices, future customer demand, upcoming technologies, etc. (Vriesa, Subramahnianb, & 
Chappinc, 2009). 
Decision makers, planners, and investors often rely on speculative knowledge and reach 
out for subject matter experts for their opinions (Ayyub, 2001; Chytka, 2003; Meyer & Booker, 
1990). Current literature holds numerous structured expert elicitation methods. Expert 
elicitation methods are often used in obtaining quantified data in situations in which it is 
impossible to make observations due to technical difficulties, lack of resources or uniqueness of 
the problem (i.e. infrastructure systems design) (Bedford & Cooke, 2001). Consequently, 
traditional expert elicitation techniques perform best when used in traditional engineering 
problems. In these problems, the final state of the project, general requirements and objective 
are enclosed. It is possible to develop a prototype/model to test the acquired data with a 
simulation and observe the outcomes. However, when it comes to eliciting socio-technical 
systems, the societal part of the problem creates a challenge. These types of problems, due to 
their nature, don't allow planners to test their solutions. Each decision making strategy, after 
being implemented, can result in consequences for an extended period of time. The 
consequences of such decisions need to be observed across the social and technical aspects of 
the problem. 
The problems associated with infrastructure development often come from both technical 
and social issues. For that reason, the interface between the two must be understood properly 
in order to develop an infrastructure transformation capability while embracing uncertainty 
(Hansman, et al., 2006). Creating a methodology aiming to outline the decision pathways of 
future systems and plan accordingly, while taking into consideration the technical, 
organizational, contextual and evaluative complexity of the system, also requires fundamental 
understanding of these interactions (Brewer, 2007; Hansman, et al., 2006). 
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There is a need for an approach to adequately create a venue for infrastructure expert 
elicitation environment, allowing both the societal and technical aspects of the problem to 
surface, while enhancing communication throughout the stakeholders. Hansman et al. 
emphasize the need for rigorous methods for developing, evaluating, and evolving future 
infrastructure architectures incorporating legacy elements along with the introduction of new 
technologies, knowledge, and demand. Such a method requires being flexible to reflect the 
latest process in infrastructure transformation and transparent enough for decision makers to 
enhance system understanding. 
The present research concentrates on developing a comprehensive methodology in order 
to support the infrastructure transformation by enhancing the stakeholder communication. The 
methodology utilizes a set of models and tools in order to help the decision making process of 
designing and evaluating scenarios for future technological implementations. The methodology 
consists of using a comprehensive, yet intuitive, risk calculation approach used in process 
industries, coupled with scenario-based serious gaming platform. The subject matter experts' 
opinions are collected for both stages, namely during the development and implementation of 
the methodology. This approach aims to substitute the need for historical data, by using a 
combination of subject matter expert (SME) opinions and projected scenarios, to help create a 
multitude of probable futures. The meaningful "experimentation" capability was developed over 
NextGen in order to demonstrate the feasibility of such an approach and obtain data regarding 
the future phases of the system with the help of several approaches and commercial-off-the-
shelf solutions present in the engineering management toolbox (Hansman, et al., 2006). 
1.5 Problem Domain 
In order to implement the aforementioned methodology, NextGen development consisting 
of a system-wide upgrade of the National Air Transportation (NAS) is taken into consideration as 
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the problem domain. The NAS is a complex global system with many public and private 
stakeholders involved with national defense, homeland security, commercial and general 
aviation and future commercial space transportation (JPDO, 2007). 
During the Bush Administration, in 2003, Congress took a significant step toward 
transforming the current Air Transportation System (ATS) via the Vision 100 - Century of 
Aviation Reauthorization Act, mandating the advent of NextGen. The Vision 100 Act also created 
a unique cooperative partnership between public and private stakeholders such as the 
Department of Transportation (DoT), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Commerce 
(DoC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Aeronautics and Space Administrator 
(NASA), the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and industry 
stakeholders by forming the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) (JPDO, 2008a). JPDO 
is charged with developing concepts, architectures, roadmaps, and implementation plans for 
transforming the current national ATS into the NextGen. 
NextGen goals include flying an increased number of passengers, cargo and types of aircraft 
more safely, precisely and efficiently, while using less fuel and creating less environmental 
impact. It is envisioned that by 2025, JPDO will manage a complete overhaul to the system, 
shifting the navigation and surveillance from ground-based to satellite-based solutions. 
Additionally, voice communications will be substituted by digital data exchange, and weather 
forecast delivery systems will be tied to a single authoritative source (FAA, 2009). According to 
the above document, during the next two decades the goal is to achieve a system that: 
• can provide two to three times the current air vehicle operations; 
• is agile enough to accommodate a changing fleet that includes very light jets (VUs), 
unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and space vehicles; 
• addresses security and national defense requirements; and 
• can ensure that aviation remains an economically viable industry (JPDO, 2007). 
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The implementation of NextGen related technologies began in 2005 and already received 
vast criticism including cost and schedule risks along with management challenges (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2010b). The NextGen transformation was selected as the 
problem domain for this research due to its high-level complexity and involvement of numerous 




This chapter will cover the main literature used to build the methodology for this research. 
This section will highlight the relevant aspects of systems thinking, complex infrastructure 
systems, system transition studies, serious gaming approach, and finally the uncertainty and 
expert elicitation. 
2.1 Systems Thinking 
The capability of accelerating and steering complex socio-technical transitions became one 
of the chief concerns of developed countries. A complex system is "a bounded set of richly 
interrelated elements for which the characteristic structural and behavioral patterns that 
produce system performance emerge over time and through interaction between the elements 
and the system interaction with the environment" (Keating, Souza-Poza, & Mun, 2004, p. 3). 
Transitioning from any current tightly coupled and complex infrastructure (e.g. electricity power 
infrastructure) for any reason (e.g. for fighting global climate change or eliminating dependency 
on imported oil, thus vulnerability, etc.) will pose great challenges for policy-makers since these 
infrastructures are decades old, fully matured, highly networked and relatively efficient system-
of-systems (e.g. the existing petroleum based supply chain with massive inertia) (Bush, Duffy, 
Sandor, & Peterson, 2008). 
Human history is packed with examples of attempts (and failures) to guide transitions at 
the meta-system level. For instance, although the United States spends more money on 
healthcare than any other nation in the world, the country's uninsured population, infant 
mortality and life expectancy levels fall behind other developed nations. In a similar fashion, the 
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war on drugs had a small impact on cocaine cultivation, production and smuggling, despite the 
billions of dollars spent each year (Sterman, 2006). From the environmental aspects, levees and 
dams aimed at controlling flooding led to even more severe floods due to the disruption of 
natural excess water dissipation. Such examples not only were unsuccessful in achieving the 
desired state of the system, they also caused more damage to the existing setup. 
Policy resistance, as described by Sterman (2001), is the side effect of any intervention 
aimed at transforming a system where interdependences and complexity are not fully 
understood. Sterman states that "you can't do just one thing" and "everything is connected to 
everything else" (Sterman, 2001, p. 9). The solution is the ability to see the world as a complex 
system, that is, systems thinking. Once a holistic worldview is adopted, it is argued that learning 
will be much faster and efficient, leading to the ability to understand the leverage points in the 
system and finally avoiding the policy resistance. However, even systems thinking and systems 
engineering are currently challenged to address increasingly complex systems due to the (1) 
elevated levels of interdependency and interoperability, (2) potentially radical requirements 
shifts caused by factors beyond technical aspects like policy or organizational funding, and (3) 
presence of an exponential rise in demand and accessibility of information (Keating, et al., 
2004). Evolution of the systems engineering field yielded to the System-of-Systems (SoS) 
concept in order to develop more robust approaches as complexity and interdependency of 
future infrastructures increase (Adams & Keating, 2011). The definition of SoS is "a Metasystem, 
comprised of multiple embedded and interrelated autonomous complex subsystems that can be 
diverse in technology, context, operation, geography, and conceptual frame .... These complex 
subsystems must function as an integrated Metasystem to produce desirable results in 
performance to achieve a higher-level mission subject to constraints" (Keating, 2005, p. 1). 
Consequently, system-of-systems engineering (SoSE) is defined as "the design, deployment, 
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operation, and transformation of metasystems that must function as an integrated complex 
system to produce desirable results" (Keating, et al., 2004, p. 5). 
Researchers quickly grasped the idea of treating large socio-technical transitions from a SoS 
perspective. The complex and interdependent characteristics of infrastructures led to the 
adoption of a SoS approach within the transition body-of-knowledge and innovation studies 
(Bush, et al., 2008; DeLaurentis, 2005; Gheorghe, Masera, Weijnen, & De Vries, 2006; Hansman, 
et al., 2006; Pfaender, DeLaurentis, & Mavris, 2003; Pruyt & Thissen, 2007). DeLaurentis (2005) 
argues that decision-makers within government and industry cannot gain adequate insight from 
conventional analysis methods that are designed to study a constrained part of the problem: 
"Current frames of reference, thought processes, analysis, and design methods are not 
complete for these SoS problems" (DeLaurentis, 2005, p. 1). The need for a holistic framework 
enabling decision-makers to judge upcoming reflections for the infrastructure design, policy 
considerations or technology adoptions is crucial (DeLaurentis, 2005; Sterman, 2001). Hansman, 
et al. (2006) point out that developing integrated socio-technical models and methodologies are 
necessary to describe the interactions between the technical infrastructure and its social 
context. The current research aims to develop this capability by developing a test-bed for 
technical, political, and economic factors interaction and uncertainties by adopting the holistic 
approach of systems engineering methodology given in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Complex Infrastructure Systems 
Infrastructures, defined as the "underlying foundation or basic framework," are man-made 
constructs to deliver and/or distribute utility services (energy, water, mobility) to the masses. 
They are considered to be capital-intensive large-scale systems consisting of physical and 
organizational interlinked components. They allow interaction of many actors (e.g. system users, 
developers, owners, policy makers, etc.) with often conflicting diverse objectives, means and 
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strategies (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008; Loorbach, 2007; Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). 
The future generations of these infrastructure systems will increase in size, scope, and 
complexity. A complex system can manifest itself with numerous elements or subsystems, has a 
high level of interrelationships between the elements or subsystems, and contains a high degree 
of hierarchical levels (Bekebrede, 2010). With the increased system complexity, subsystem and 
component interactions increase, yielding more unexpected emergent properties and 
unanticipated consequences. Consequently, the system interpretations regarding the problem 
context get more diverse due to biased and distorted views brought by an increased number of 
individuals or stakeholders (Brewer, 2007; Roos, et al., 2004). Depending on the issues 
considered, each stakeholder provides its own perspective and interpretation, seriously 
affecting decision making processes and systems operations2. 
2.2.1 Interdependency 
Another prominent characteristic of complex infrastructure systems is interdependency. 
Dependency is a unidirectional linkage between two infrastructures where the state of one 
infrastructure is directly correlated to the other (Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Examples of dependency 
are the power and telecommunications utilities. Telecommunication infrastructure requires 
power to operate, but the opposite is not necessarily true. On the other hand, interdependency 
designates a bidirectional relationship between infrastructures, connected as a system of 
systems. Power infrastructures and water utilities are interdependent on each other where 
water, necessary for cooling purposes, is controlled by pumps and lift stations which in turn 
require power. There are four types of interdependencies: physical, cyber, geographic, and 
As Gheorghe (2004) stated, complex infrastructure systems are threatened with systemic risks, 
large-scale risks with trans-boundary ramifications, characterized by three major challenges; complexity, 
genuine uncertainty and ambiguity. These risks inhabit at the intersection of numerous aspects of critical 
infrastructure systems, namely, natural events, economic, social, and technological developments within 
a policy-driven environment. 
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logical interdependencies3. The NAS and the aviation system, as a part of the transportation 
infrastructure, also contain these interdependencies among airports, airline companies as well 
as other stakeholders and entities. 
2.2.2 Complexi ty 
Future infrastructure systems will experience a multi-dimensional complexity. In general, 
the complexities can be categorized under two main types, technical/physical and 
social/political complexity, where the main difference in these two is the presence of 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors (See Table 2-1, Adapted from Mayer, 2009, p.845). 
Table 2-1 Technical/Physical and Social/Political Complexities (Mayer, 2009) 
Technical/Physical Complexity 
Quantifiable factors 
Many interdependent variables (system 
complexity) 
Cognitive uncertainty 
Emergent behavior (e.g. counterintuitive) 
Design phases (linear of iterative steps of 
building and using model) 
Best solution, best available knowledge, 
optimization, validity, fidelity 
Hard computer tools: simulations, models, 
decision support systems 
Social/Political Complexity 
Non-quantifiable factors 
Many interdependent, loosely coupled stakeholders 
(multi-actor complexity) 
Disputed or contested knowledge, values and norms 
Strategic behavior to optimize own interests, making 
use of loop holes in the policy 
Dynamic rounds and arenas; volatile, erratic policy-
making processes 
Accepted solution, negotiated knowledge, political 
compromises 
Soft tools: participation, process management, think 
thank meetings 
Physical interdependency, as the name implies, arises from the physical linkage between the two 
infrastructure systems, e.g. railroad transportation and electric power generation. Fuel necessary for the 
power generation is delivered via railroad, which requires power at all times to operate rail signals, 
switches and controls. Cyber interdependency implies the information transfer between systems, 
increasingly used in all infrastructure systems with supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems utilized in electric power grid control. Geographic interdependency relates to the physical 
proximity of two or more infrastructure systems where a local environmental event can create 
disturbances in all the systems. A recent example for the geographic interdependency is the 2011 Tohoku 
Earthquake in Japan where the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants experienced meltdowns caused by 
tsunamis. Finally, logical interdependency can be determined where one infrastructure is linked to 
another one without the presence of physical, cyber, or geographic connection. An example of such 
interdependency is the link between electric power and financial infrastructures. Electricity market 
deregulation legislation passed in 1996 lead to power crisis in late 2000 in California (Rinaldi, et al., 2001). 
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Roos et al. (2004) further detailed complexity: technical complexity, organizational 
complexity, contextual complexity, and evaluative complexity. Technical complexity involves the 
design of infrastructure systems, inherently more complicated than the primitive versions, 
aimed at solving trivial engineering problems. Besides the traditional engineering performance 
criteria like performance and cost, designers also consider sustainability, flexibility, adaptability, 
safety, security, vulnerability and robustness. Organizational complexity arises from the nature 
of large-scale infrastructure systems involving numerous organizations from public and private 
sectors along with non-governmental organizations. Managing the process and information 
flows, configuration of human resources between these organizations with different corporate 
culture and values is a challenging task. Contextual complexity involves the internalization of so 
called externalities that are often left out while designing traditional engineering. Evaluative 
complexity surfaces when the large array of stakeholder groups involved in or affected by the 
design of the infrastructure systems have different perspectives (Roos, et al., 2004). The 
evaluative complexity is stemmed by the presence of numerous social parameters in the 
infrastructure design. The next section will provide more details on social aspects of the 
problem. 
Throughout the maturation of the present research, previous studies associated with multi-
dimensional complexity of technical systems were performed. One of the studies involves the 
integration of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) integration to NAS (Ancel & Gheorghe, 2008). 
Although proven beneficial on several areas of application, the integration of UASs to NAS is 
considered a rather challenging task due to technical, societal, and political interdependencies 
inherently present within the airspace. The study investigated employing object-oriented 
programming (OOP) to demonstrate the multi-layer complexity of the integration plan while 
introducing a "business process" concept. For that purpose, UAS-NAS integration was modeled 
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using TopEase® software which is developed upon the OOP paradigm. The model was able to 
provide a full visualization of the integration phases, covering aspects like safety, security, air 
traffic management, regulation and socio-economic issues, allowing stakeholders or decision 
makers to examine the different layers of the process while observing the overall safety and 
performance parameters (see Appendix A4) 
2.2.3 Socio-technical Issues 
The complex socio-technical systems such as large-scale infrastructures are separated from 
common engineering tasks by the presence of a large number of mutually dependent public and 
private stakeholders with different perceptions, interests, values, and objectives (Bekebrede, 
2010; Luna-Reyes, et al., 2005; Mayer, et al., 2004). Problems with a social context are more 
complex given the number of non-simple interactions among the components and players: 
In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of its parts, not in an ultimate 
metaphysical sense, but the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of 
the parts and the laws of interaction, it is a non-trivial matter to infer the properties of 
the whole system (Brewer, 2007, p. 160). 
Planning problems where technical, social and economic characteristics are intertwined are 
inherently challenging and require different tools in order to understand their inner workings. 
Sociotechnical contexts must be designed in systemic, e.g. they adopt the idea that all aspects of 
a system are interconnected and they all should be addressed jointly. A difference in emphasis 
on any of the components during the design phase (e.g. technology over social aspects) will 
cause the system to underperform (Clegg, 2000). Rittel & Webber (1973) coined the phrase 
"wicked problems" for such planning problems, essentially different from the pure technical 
problems that scientists and engineers deal with. Problems found in the natural sciences (or 
Appendix A includes further details on the complex structure of UAS-NAS integration problem. 
Experience gathered from working with OOP and agents helped shaping the present research framework 
by assigning characteristics to different objects such as participants (or stakeholders), laws, and 
regulations, fuel prices, terrorist activities for the case study which will be covered in Chapter 4. 
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technical problems) are definable and separable, and their solutions are obtainable. On the 
other hand, problems related to social and policy planning are ill-defined, and they depend upon 
political judgment and common consensus for resolution. The next generation infrastructure 
planning problems contain the societal aspects Rittel & Webber define as "wicked," in addition 
to the multi-dimensional complexity that is synonymous with such systems. Rittel & Webber 
classify the problems engineers and scientists focus on as "tame" or "benign" where the mission 
is clear. These problems are clear in definition regardless of their complexity or whether they 
can be solved or not. On the other hand, planning-type problems are malignant in nature 
because they don't have a definitive formulation, they have no stopping-rule or there is no way 
to test the solution. 
The presence of multiple stakeholders with various agendas creates policy resistance, 
arising from dynamic complexity. Dynamic complexity is an often counterintuitive complex 
system behavior caused by the interaction of agents over time (Sterman, 2000). Depending on 
the issue at stake, various perceptions, diverse interpretations and proprietary assumptions 
create diversity which is not necessarily a positive thing given the persistent lack of time and 
resources associated with modernization of complex infrastructure systems (Brewer, 2007). The 
presence of societal factors creates wicked problems where the solution requires understanding 
the problem, yet the problem cannot be understood ahead of time without tackling it first. The 
modernization of next generation infrastructure systems involves understanding the different 
levels of complexity involved with such systems. 
2.2.4 Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
Infrastructures are often designed to meet certain criteria, arising from the needs of 
society. The new elements of infrastructure systems are engineered with the influence of 
various stakeholders during the development phases. Infrastructure systems evolve and adapt 
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to the changing environment when users adopt new services and functions (Janssen, et al., 
2009). The adaptation of the complex ensemble of users and organizations occurs as a result of 
the learning process, happening at multiple levels. Due to the characteristics mentioned above, 
infrastructures are often viewed and analyzed as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) (Bekebrede, 
2010; Janssen, et al., 2009; Lei, Bekebrede, & Nikolic, 2010; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). 
CAS are systems that have a large number of components (often called agents), adapting 
and learning as they interact with each other. Challenges like controlling the internet (viruses 
and spam), understanding markets, predicting changes in global trade, strengthening immune 
systems all represent CAS. Consequently, the agents of CAS can be from a wide array of 
contexts, namely cells, species, individuals, firms, nations, etc. and any coherent behavior 
emerging stems from the cooperation and competition amongst these agents5. 
2.3 System Transitions Studies 
Several bodies of knowledge focused on understanding, planning, and forecasting future 
technological innovations affecting infrastructure systems. Researchers and policy makers 
investigated the technological advancements and how the transition from old technology to 
new ones occurred. Throughout history, mankind witnessed numerous technological 
substitutions. For instance, the fuel source for the energy sector was substituted many times: 
from wood to coal, to hydrocarbons (or fossil fuel), to nuclear fuels, and to renewable energy 
sources (Fisher & Pry, 1971; Geels & Schot, 2007). Similarly, electric vehicles, internal 
combustion automobiles and hybrid sources were substituted back and forth for personal 
The agents' interactions are often non-linear and system behavior cannot be deducted from the 
component behavior. The general characteristics of CAS are the presence of the adaptive agents 
(dynamic stakeholder behavior, learning and adapting to new conditions), co-evolution (entities evolve 
partially depending on each other), and the emergent behavior (new structures, patterns, and properties 
arise, e.g. self-organization) (Bekebrede, 2010; Holland, 2006; Morowitz & Singer, 1995). Bekebrede also 
demonstrated that serious gaming methods adequately address the CAS behavior of complex 
infrastructure properties. Serious gaming will be elaborated on Section 2.4. 
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transportation as technology advanced. In order to understand and model such transitions both 
quantitative and qualitative methods have emerged6. 
Researchers investigated numerous infrastructure and transition related phenomena using 
the aforementioned methods in energy, transportation and aviation infrastructures. Examples of 
such work include the EU Energy System including the evaluation of several electricity 
generation technologies (Geels & Schot, 2007; Pruyt & Thissen, 2007) or market penetration of 
fuel cell vehicles in the German automotive market (Keles, Wietschel, Most, & Rentz, 2008) or 
biofuel usage in U.S. transportation infrastructure (Bush, et al., 2008). The air transportation 
infrastructure was also modeled to investigate capacity growth (Miller & Clarke, 2007), taxation 
strategies (Sherry, Mezhepoglu, Goldner, Yablonski, & Knorr, 2005), resource management 
(Galvin, 2002), unmanned aircraft system integration (DeLaurentis, Cagatay, Mavris, & Schrage, 
2001; Pfaender, et al., 2003) or technology integration (Mozdzanowksa et al., 2007; 
Mozdzanowska, Weibel, & Hansman, 2008) issues. However, the studies cited above a) either 
work with the current well-understood system dynamics, b) model the future phases of the 
system only with a numerical approximation of societal effects or c) include solely the technical 
aspects of the system under consideration. The comprehensive integration of social and 
technical aspects of infrastructures cannot be represented with feedback models or object 
oriented methods. 
With these methods, researchers aim to define the complex relationships and long-term 
behavior and policy resistance (Bekebrede, 2010; Mayer, 2009; Sterman, 2000). Although very 
These methods were used for military planning purposes including logistics, convoy routing and 
bombing raids during the Second World War. Following the Second World War, decision sciences 
including operations research, systems analysis, and policy analysis were used to develop optimal 
solutions for well-structured planning and management problems. Methods derived from applied 
mathematics, modeling, game theory, decision analysis, and computer simulations were used to 
investigate the effects of changing technological, economic and social environments. System Dynamics, 
Cellular Automata, and Agent Based Models were developed to simulate complex systems where 
sensitive parameters and unexpected behavior determination (Mayer, 2009). 
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powerful in replicating past innovation trends and able to explain unexpected behaviors after 
they have surfaced, simulation methods contain important drawbacks. Simulations do not 
include the political and positional rationality of stakeholders and social actors in the model. It 
is proven difficult to investigate feedback loops (e.g. system dynamics models) between causes 
and effects in societal problems (van Dijkum, 2001). The stakeholders can only be a part of the 
model once their behaviors are determined and quantified (Bekebrede, 2010). However, as 
Rittel & Webber stated, in order to capture the societal aspects of the problem, the problem 
needs to be understood in the first place (Rittel & Webber, 1973). The other drawback of 
simulations is that they are often very complex and based on mathematical formulations, 
making simulations "black boxes" for decision makers and infrastructure planners (Bekebrede, 
2010, p. 12; Duke, 1974). The lack of communication between simulation designers and policy 
makers creates a gap which has proven to be problematic and decreases efficiency of the model. 
With the introduction of participatory modeling or group modeling it is possible to eliminate the 
effects of a lack of communication between the modeler and the decision maker, but due to 
their nature, computer simulations are unable to represent the dynamic and uncertain patterns 
of societal behavior. 
Besides numerical methods, another body-of-knowledge called Transition Management 
(TM), emerged in the Netherlands. TM studies are involved in examining large sociotechnical 
transformations such as global environmental change related to C02 emissions within the EU 
(Chappin & Dijkema, 2008; Geels, 2002, 2005; van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005). 
Sustainability within the transition process is one of the key components in TM research and the 
goal is to empower and support ongoing sustainable development from a coherent and systemic 
perspective (Loorbach, 2007). TM theory emphasizes that large-scale system change cannot 
depend on technological advancements alone but also requires manual institutional and socio-
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cultural transformations. TM is build upon the multi-level perspective (MLP) of system 
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Figure 2-1 Transition Phases within the MLP approach (Geels, 2002) 
Although it theoretically provides a framework for the transition process on large-scale 
technological systems, TM research is on the conceptual level and lacks the explicit 
The MLP is a framework to understand the inner workings of the system innovation occurrence and 
to help determining certain patterns. MLP consists of three levels, micro-level (niche), meso-level 
(regime) and macro-levels (landscape) and has a bottom-up approach. The technological niches are 
situated at the micro-level where radical innovations (or variations) take place (Genus & Coles, 2008). In a 
system transition, these innovations are linked together and stabilized. With the increased internal 
momentum, the new configuration breaks through the existing dynamically stable ongoing process 
through a window opportunity (i.e. congestion, environmental concerns, etc.) With the influence from 
the new configuration, the socio-technical regime adjusts itself to accommodate the competition created 
by the new technology. With time, the new technology replaces the old one and gets accepted at a wider 
range. 
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methodology to effectively learn and manage large-scale transitions. The MLP is presented as a 
global model, unable to cater to the complexity and ambivalence of specific case studies (Genus 
& Coles, 2008; Loorbach, 2007; van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005). 
2.4 Serious Gaming and Policy Gaming 
Over the last few decades, practitioners and management scholars increasingly criticized 
the conventional strategy making methods, arguing that rapidly changing environments require 
emerging and creative approaches. Serious gaming (simulation game or gaming, used 
interchangeably within the text) discipline is found to be increasingly useful within mainstream 
strategy literature involved with former strategy making approaches (Geurts, Duke, & 
Vermeulen, 2007). A definition of gaming simulation is given as a representation of a set of key 
relationships and structure elements of a particular issue or a problem environment, where the 
behavior of actors and the effects of their decision are a direct result of the rules guiding the 
interaction between these actors (Wenzler, 2003, pp. 146-147). 
Serious gaming is an activity where two or more independent decision-makers seek to 
achieve their objectives within a limited context8: "The participants (or the players) of the game 
perform a set of activities in an attempt to achieve goals in a limiting context consisting of 
constraints and of definitions of contingencies (Greenblat & Duke, 1975, p. 106)". These games 
are labeled "serious" because their primary objective is educational and/or informative as 
opposed to pure entertainment. 
Serious games allow researchers to model problems with societal aspects which can often be found 
in next generation infrastructure transition efforts. The advantage of simulation gaming over traditional 
computer simulation models is that the stakeholders do not have to be represented by mathematical 
formulations; instead, they are played by the participants themselves (Bekebrede, 2010). Representing 
complex systems with serious gaming models save the model builders the need to build in the 
psychological assumptions since they are represented by the stakeholders. 
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Simulation games have many different forms and aim to provide insights for various goals. 
The common point on each simulation game is that reality is simulated through the interaction 
of role players using non-formal symbols as well as formal, computerized sub-models when 
necessary. This approach allows the group of participants to create and analyze future worlds 
they are willing to explore. Lately, large organizations reported serious gaming simulation uses 
for their organizational change management efforts (Wenzler & van Muijen, 2009). 
Duke (1974) argues that formal complexity communication methods are inadequate when 
it comes to problems of the future due to their exponentially increasing complexity. He believes 
that "the citizen, the policy researcher or other decision maker must first comprehend the 
whole -the entirely, the system, before the particulars can be dealt with" (Duke, 1974, p. 10). 
The serious gaming method approach with respect to other techniques is given in Figure 2-2. 
Gaming simulation techniques can handle "many variables" and are distinguished from other 
techniques by being relatively uncalibrated and intuitive (Duke, 1974, p. xv). Each serious game 
is situation specific; consequently, they should only be performed within the intended and 
designed context. Failure to do so will result in poor results9. 
Researchers argue whether simulation and gaming is a standalone academic field of study or a 
useful tool that can be used by other disciplines. The source of the ongoing debates is stemmed from the 
interdisciplinary nature of these games. The simulation and gaming is certainly an advanced tool in 
various areas like education, business, and urban studies, environmental issues etc. yet, to date, gaming 
researchers are still working towards a common theory and an established field of academic study 
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Figure 2-2 Schematic Location of Gaming/Simulation (Duke, 1974) 
2.4.1 Brief History 
The earliest and the most common uses of simulation gaming are so-called war games 
dating back to the 19th century and involved exploration, planning, testing, and training of 
military strategies, tactics and operations in a simulated interactive and sociotechnical 
environment (Mayer, 2009). With the emergence of decision sciences like operations research 
(OR), systems analysis (SA), and policy analysis (PA), the early serious gaming efforts initially 
received large skepticism. However, simulation and gaming methods (or soft systems thinking) 
became an alternative to formal complexity modeling techniques like systems analysis, systems 
dynamics and operational research. These techniques were successfully applied to well-
structured problems; yet, when considering the ambiguous and often ill-structured and complex 
systems, their contribution was limited since adequate theory and empirical data were absent. 
Serious gaming methods are able to provide decision makers with an environment in which the 
totality of the system and its dynamics are present. With a holistic approach that includes the 
wide-range of perspectives, skills, information, and mental models of the involved parties, the 
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quality of the decision-making environment increases dramatically (Geurts, et al., 2007; 
Wenzler, 2008). 
In the late 1940s the RAND Corporation (Research and Development) created methods for 
systems and policy analysis to improve governmental decision making. Although gaming alone 
was still not considered to be a scientific approach within the policy analysis toolbox, the 
decision making society saw gaming as the 'language of complexity', a very useful approach to 
designing computer models. Several European Nations, especially the Netherlands, practiced 
various gaming exercises and gaming styles like spatial planning of the country at the national 
scale (participants played the roles of private and public investors, governmental licensers, 
stakeholders, and citizens). In the late 1990s, a large number of scientists leaned into the 
computer-based simulations given the developments on that platform. They adopted the 
concepts and technology derived for games for entertainment purposes and developed games 
like SIM HEALTH (U.S. Health care simulation), SPLASH (water resource management), and 
NITROGENIUS (multiplayer, multi-stakeholder game aiming to solve nitrogen problems). By 
2000, games started to be employed for purposes like healthcare, policy making, education, etc. 
with the adoption of the oxymoron, serious games (Mayer, 2009). 
2.4.2 Serious Gaming Uses 
Serious games are developed to serve several different purposes. However, the most 
important contribution of gaming methods is their ability to enhance communication among 
various actors. This lead researchers to utilize gaming methods intensively in complex system 
exposition where complex systems with social aspects are examined (G. Bekebrede, Mayer, van 
Houten, Chin, & Verbraeck, 2005; Duke, 1974). Policy-gaming exercises carry various objectives 
like understanding system complexity, improving communication, promoting individual and 
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collective learning, ' creating consensus among players, and motivating participants to 
enhance their creativity or collaboration (Geurts, et al., 2007). Policy games are often used in 
understanding complex infrastructure systems which will be covered within the next section. 
2.4.3 Serious Gaming and Infrastructure Design 
The complexity involved with system transition of large infrastructure systems is given in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The discrepancies associated with such infrastructure transitions are 
related to the lack of understanding of societal aspects of these systems. For that reason, 
several serious gaming exercises are developed to assist decision makers, experience system 
complexity and train stakeholders. Serious games can represent the multi-level system 
architecture by proprietary rules at the player level, interaction of the players, and the system 
levels. The complexity associated with infrastructures (both the technical/physical and social-
political levels) is integrated within the gaming platform for stakeholders to experience an 
abstract representation of the system and make informed decisions (Mayer, 2009). Several 
infrastructure systems are represented using serious games. 
Serious gaming methods are often used as an educational technique to train players from high-
school students to professional emergency responders (Greenblat & Duke, 1975; Shiratori, et al., 2003). 
Additionally, gaming methods are often employed in tandem with various fields; e.g. war-gaming, 
business-gaming, policy-gaming, urban-gaming, etc. Policy-gaming exercises assist organizations in 
exploring policy options, developing decision making and strategic change support. Such policy exercises 
can be used in a variety of problems; from deregulating public utility sectors, to reorganizing the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, to restructuring cities with urban planning games, to investigating various policy 
options for global climate change, to restructuring UK's National Health Care System, crisis management 
at National Levels (Brewer, 2007; Crookall & Arai, 1995; Geurts, et al., 2007; Mayer, 2009; Wenzler, 
Kleinlugtenbelt, & Mayer, 2005) 
11
 Games that are designed for individual learning can be categorized under three main objectives; 
training participants for a situation/scenario, changing participants' mental model with increased 
awareness, and attaining participants' support. Games where the collective learning is aimed three 
categories of objectives are observed; discovering (understanding a situation and exchanging ideas), 
testing (carrying out experiments to check the value or effectiveness of the options), and implementing 
(realizing the organizational change for training purposes) (Greenblat & Duke, 1975; Joldersma & Geurts, 
1998) 
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Unlike hard-system methods, the gaming and simulation approach is quite flexible and 
easily adaptable to other quantitative methods, scenarios, and computer models (Mayer, 2009). 
Policy gaming methods can help both participants and modelers understand the big picture and 
identify critical elements of the complex problem at hand. Because of the iterative and 
experimental nature of these gaming and simulation environments, participants are able to test 
different approaches within both a safe environment and a condensed timeframe (Wenzler, 
2008). INFRASTRETEGO is an example of a serious gaming-based decision making tool, aimed at 
encapsulating the Dutch electricity market. Game developers used the game to examine 
strategic behavior in a liberalizing electricity market while examining the effectiveness of two 
main types of regulatory regimes. Strategic behavior is the use of administrative and/or 
regulatory processes such as stalling, delaying, or appealing interconnection negotiations, 
engaging in anti-competitive pricing, or other methods that can be encountered within 
liberalization of utility industries. Empirical research indicates that strategic behavior may affect 
the level playing field and public values in a negative way. Overall, the game was able to identify 
the undesirable, unintended and unforeseen effects of strategic behavior phenomena. Serious 
gaming enabled monitoring and measurement of strategic behavior as it occurred since 
participants did not have any fear of litigation and were able to report the development of the 
strategic behavior which cannot be observed in real-world situations (Kuit, Mayer, & de Jong, 
2005; Wilson et al., 2009)12. 
12
 Similar to INFRASTRATEGO, games like THE UTILITY COMPANY and UTILITIES 21, along with other 
market, policy or performance simulation models are related to deregulation of utility companies 
(Wenzler, et al., 2005). One example of a fully-computer based simulation game is SIMPort, involving 
infrastructure planning and land designation for the extension on Port of Rotterdam. SIMPort is used to 
support the actual decision making process characterized by high level of uncertainty, path dependence 
and strategic stakeholder behavior, coupled with technical, political and external factors such as national 
and global economy (G. Bekebrede, et al., 2005; Warmerdam, Knepfle, Bidarra, Bekebrede, & Mayer, 
2006). Furthermore, games like RESCUE TEAM and KING OF FISHERMEN are examples of games geared 
towards teaching and training of business ethics which were the causes of two major corporate accidents 
in Japan's nuclear industry (Wenzler, et al., 2005). 
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2.5 Uncertainty and Expert Elicitation 
2.5.1 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is one of the core elements that need to be taken into consideration when 
analyzing and designing next generation infrastructure systems. Sound risk decision strategy 
formulations require prior identification and quantification of uncertainties (Chytka, 2003). 
Uncertainty is defined as the inability to determine the true state of a system and is caused by 
incomplete knowledge or stochastic variability (Chytka, p. 9). There are two types of uncertainty 
in engineering, classified as internal and external. Internal uncertainty is caused by (1) limited 
information in estimating the characteristics of model parameters for a given, fixed model 
structure and (2) limited information regarding the model structure itself. External uncertainties 
come from variability in model prediction caused by plausible alternatives, also referred to as 
input parameter uncertainty (Ayyub, 2001; Chytka, 2003). 
The design and implementation process of socio-technical systems does not contain 
specifications, regulations or codes as in the case of designing traditional engineering systems. 
Instead, designing for uncertainty requires that policy makers to make decisions in situations 
where scenarios of competitive forces, shifts in customer preferences, and changing 
technological environment are largely unpredictable (Cooke & Goossens, 2004; Roos, et al., 
2004). The uncertainty emerges from two sources: knowledge of the system and knowledge of 
the social response. Table 2-2 outlines the four types of problems arising from these initial 
conditions. As previously covered, large-scale infrastructure transitions are often considered as 
wicked (or ill-structured) problems (located at the bottom-right hand corner of the table). 
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Table 2-2 Uncertainty and Problem Types 
Knowledge on 
Technical & Physical 
Parameters -> 





Substantial information on the system 
and its environment with substantial 
agreement on the objectives, 
solutions and effects (tame problems) 
There is no uncertainty or conflict 
regarding the parameters or 
consequences on the social aspects, 
however the knowledge on the 
physical system parameters is limited 
(untamed technical problems) 
Low 
Technical solutions are available but their 
consequences either create social conflicts 
or they are not fully comprehended 
(untamed political problems) 
Little consensus on both the technical and 
social aspects of the problem is present. 
Solutions and their future consequences 
along with the societal responses are 
unknown (wicked problems) 
Infrastructure planners and designers need to obtain data regarding the future phases of 
the system transition. The required data for both developing the socio-technical transition 
model and for governing risks should mostly be provided using expert judgment and elicitation, 
which will be covered next. 
2.5.2 Expert Elicitation and Aggregation Methods 
Expert judgment is "Expert judgment data given by an expert in response to a technical 
problem. An expert is a person who has background in the subject area and is recognized by his 
or her peers or those conducting the study as qualified to answer questions" (Meyer & Booker, 
1990, p.3). Expert judgment is used when information from other sources like observations, 
experimentation, or simulation is not available. Subject matter expert opinions are often 
employed on the estimation of new, rare, complex or otherwise inadequately understood cases, 
future forecasting efforts, or to integrate/interpret existing qualitative/quantitative data (Meyer 
& Booker, 1990). Multiple methods exist regarding the different elicitation techniques such as 
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group interaction, independent assessment, questionnaires, qualitatively obtained data, 
calibrating expert judgment data, knowledge acquisition dynamics, and learning process studies. 
(Chytka, et al., 2006; Cooke & Goossens, 2004; Gustafson, Shukla, Delbecq, & Walster, 1973; 
Keeney & von Winterfeldt, 1989) 
Large-scale socio-technical systems are made out of multiple components, involving various 
stakeholders, technologies, policies and social factors (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008). The 
multi-dimensional aspect of the next generation infrastructure systems requires decision makers 
to take into consideration all the complexity and uncertainty associated with such systems 
(Roos, et al., 2004). Decision and policy makers often require expert opinions to comprehend 
and manage the complexity within such systems. The data regarding various subsystems within 
the meta-system needs to be obtained from a group of experts and combined (or aggregated) in 
order to assist the decision making process (Cooke & Goossens, 2004). Individual expert's 
assessments are elicited and aggregated by mathematical and behavioral approaches (Chytka, 
2003; Cooke & Goossens, 2004; Cooke & Singuran, 2008). Aggregation algorithms such as the 
Bayesian method13, Logarithmic Opinion Pool, and Linear Opinion Pool14 are used to combine 
the expert opinions regarding a system with known results. However, for future events with 
unknown results, behavioral methods and linear opinion pool were found to be more adequate 
(Figure 2-3). 
Bayesian approaches are used for subjective type of information where knowledge (i.e. 
probabilities) is a combination of objective (prior) and subjective (obtained from the experts) knowledge. 
Although subjective expert opinion is integrated into the knowledge, Bayesian method still requires prior 
knowledge regarding parameter which doesn't exist for future events with unknown results (Ayyub, 2001; 
Bedford & Cooke, 2001). 
The opinion pool methods combine the elicited distribution via linear or logarithmic weighted 
averages. The opinion pools have been used in fields like meteorology, banking, marketing, etc. where 
there the experts weighting factors are validated with either historical data or the observance of the 
event which was very near term (Chytka, 2003). 
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Multiple Expert Opinions Elicitation 

















Logarithmic Opinion Pool 
Figure 2-3 Expert Elicitation and Aggregation Methods 
The behavioral approaches seek to come to a consensus among the participants through 
different forms of interaction including brainstorming, the Delphi Method15, the Nominal Group 
Technique16 and Decision Conferencing17 (Ayyub, 2001; Cooke & Goossens, 2004; French, et al., 
1992). Behavioral approaches suffer f rom different expert personalities leading to dominance 
of certain individuals or group polarizations. 
15
 Delphi method was heavily used in 1960s and 1970s on long-range technological innovation 
forecasting studies and policy analysis. The process involves an initial estimation session, followed by 
discussions and revision of the initial assessments. Typically the opinions converge to a high degree of 
consensus following two or three iterations (Meyer & Booker, 1990). The Delphi method is no longer used 
as extensively since it does not carry uncertainty indicators and it falls short on complex system forecasts 
with multiple factors (Cooke & Goossens, 2004). 
16
 The Nominal Group Technique (NGT) allows expert interaction by presenting and discussing their 
assessments in front of the group. Following the discussions, each expert ranks the portrayed opinions 
silently where the aggregated ranking of these opinions represent the consensus among stakeholders. 
Scenario analysis revolves around two questions (1) how a certain hypothetical condition can be realized, 
and (2) what are the alternatives for preventing, diverting, or facilitating the process. Decision and event 
trees along with respective scenario probabilities are used to predict a future state (Ayyub, 2001) 
The decision conferencing is used to establish context and explore the issues at hand. It is used to 
facilitate making decisions and reaching consensus on complex issues such as planning the events 
following the Chernobyl disaster. Decision conferencing is often based upon multi-attribute decision 
analysis (MCDA) and help simulate discussions and eliciting issues. Events are often short, two-day 
conferences where the interested parties and experts gather to formulate and implement policy actions 
to offer the best way forward (French, Kelly, & Morrey, 1992) 
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The mathematical approaches covered above are often used to determine the technical 
parameters of systems at hand including the performance or safety values of newly developed 
systems. However, uncertainties resulting from the interdependency of stakeholder groups also 
have to be considered when modeling next generation transition efforts. Similarly, behavioral 
approaches received large criticism since participants of these methods had the urge to over-
simplify their assumptions. Because complex systems often exhibit strongly counter-intuitive 
behavior, researchers simply cannot rely on intuition, judgment, and arguments from experts 
when eliciting behavioral data regarding complex systems (Linstone & Turoff, 1975): "[...] 
everything interacts with everything and the tools of the classical hard sciences are usually 
inadequate. And certainly most of us cannot deal mentally with such a magnitude of 
interactions" (Linstone & Turoff, p. 579). Also, when it comes to employing experts to elicit 
data, researchers often realized that specialists usually focus on the subsystem and mostly 
ignore the larger system characteristics. The mathematical or behavioral aggregation methods 
cannot be adequately used for gathering data from experts when it comes to large-scale system 
transitions. 
2.5.3 Serious Gaming and Data Generation 
A literature review revealed a limited number of studies regarding use of serious games as 
a data generation method. A study conducted by Rosendale (1989) employed role-playing as a 
data generation method about the use of language in speech act situations. The study was 
designed to reveal basic characteristics about how invitations within platonic and romantic 
situations occur. The gaming method was the only adequate method to gather data in these 
situations because authentic interactions cannot be observed without violating participants' 
privacy. Although Rosendale states that the role-play method has been shown to be a valid and 
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reliable method, the limitations of using this method brought up questions about its validity and 
ability to represent real world interactions between humans (Rosendale, 1989). 
Similar to Rosendale, Demeter (2007) also suggested using role-play as a data collection 
method related to apology speech acts by analyzing how apologies take place in different 
situations. Participants, chosen from English majors at a university from Romania, were 
engaged in a role-playing environment and asked to apologize within the scenarios presented to 
them. The naturally occurring discussions were collected and compared against another 
method called discourse completion tests (DCT). The author concluded that in some instances, 
role-playing produced more realistic data since it allowed participants to actually speak instead 
of writing their responses and they were more authentic since a natural setting was created by 
the scenarios (Demeter, 2007). Another qualitative study using role-playing to generate data 
was conducted by Halleck (2007). The gaming method was used to evaluate a nonnative 
speaker's oral efficiency using simulated dialogues. The biggest advantage of using role-playing 
is given as its ability to simulate a real conversation environment without violating participants' 
privacy. 
Besides generating data for speech act studies, the only study related to data elicitation 
was the REEFGAME, simulating the marine ecosystems in order to learn from different 
management strategies, livelihood options and ecological degradation (Cleland, Dray, Perez, 
Trinidad, & Geronimo, 2010). The data generation ability of the game was limited to the 
decision-making processes of the stakeholders (fishers) which can be categorized under 
collective learning regarding complexity, and it was not elaborated on any further. 
Considering the studies above, the literature survey did not provide any intensive data 
generation study conducted with serious gaming approaches, demonstrating the uniqueness of 
the study at hand. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A METHODOLOGY FOR TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
TRANSITION 
The history of infrastructure development shows that the majority of the challenges 
associated with transitions are related to social aspects, rather than technology related issues. 
The pressure from various stakeholders with different agendas renders the infrastructure 
transition rather challenging. For this reason, decision makers and other stakeholders must 
experiment with design alternatives and their implications. Methodologies related to increasing 
communication, understanding, and alignment among stakeholders from diverse backgrounds, 
objectives and roles need to be employed in concert. Developing a model comprising these 
interrelationships, along with the induced technical and social complexity is the main approach 
of this research. The model should include drivers for change (new technologies, congestion, 
decay, efficiency and reliability, changing needs, etc.), constraints (existing structure, cost, 
environmental, social, and political impacts and externalities) and also context (government 
intervention, stakeholder actions, social factors, economic and political opportunities including 
developing new standards and protocols) (Hansman, et al., 2006). 
The developed methodology in this dissertation consists of creating a platform capable of 
integrating technical infrastructure transition and its social context. This platform is aimed to 
serve both as an expert elicitation venue (similar to questionnaire or interviews in formal expert 
elicitation methods) and as a means of aggregation (combining opinions from multiple experts 
via approaches like the Bayesian method, opinion pools, etc.). Components of the proposed 
methodology (serious gaming, expert elicitation, and complex infrastructures) and their 
significance have been discussed in previous chapters. This chapter will provide a more holistic 
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capture of the research methodology, design, development and execution of the elicitation 
approach as well as discussions of its validity. 
3.1 A System-of-Systems Engineering Methodology 
The reasoning behind undertaking large and complex infrastructures such as the air 
transportation system with a system-of-systems approach is given in Section 2.1 of the literature 
review. As previously defined, the SoS understanding includes embracing and undertaking the 
problem as a Metasystem, ensuring unison functioning of the interrelated and independent 
systems (Adams & Keating, 2011). Consequently, within the case study covered in this 
dissertation, the various systems constituting NAS (airlines companies, airports, government 
organizations, public, etc.) are treated as part of a higher-level system in addition to their 
internal structures. 
The current research is geared towards developing a next generation infrastructure 
planning and data elicitation venue to extract and aggregate expert opinions for large-scale 
sociotechnical systems. As Keating et al. (2004) argued, a methodology provides a framework 
and is more general than a detailed method or tool, yet more specific than a philosophy. This 
framework should be designed to be effectively tailored in order to guide action. The 
characteristic attributes of a SoS engineering based methodology identified by Keating et al. are 
found to be suitable with the transformation efforts of large sociotechnical systems. The 
attributes are adapted from Keating, et al. and are given in Table 3-1. Attributes were employed 
to ensure that the proposed methodology meets the attributes of a system-based approach. 
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Methodology Attribute Description 
Capable of application across a spectrum of complex systems engineering 
problems and contexts. 
Linkage of the methodology to a theoretical body of knowledge as well as 
philosophical underpinnings that form the basis for the methodology and 
its application. 
The methodology must provide sufficient detail to frame appropriate 
actions and guide direction of efforts to implement the methodology. 
While not prescriptively defining "how" execution must be accomplished, 
the methodology must establish the high level "whats" that must be 
performed. 
The methodology must exhibit the "holistic" capacity to address multiple 
problem system domains, minimally including contextual, human, 
organizational, managerial, policy, technical, and political aspects of a 
system of systems problem. 
Capable of providing replicability of approach and results interpretation 
based on deployment of the methodology in similar contexts. 
Capable of flexing and modifying the approach configuration, execution, 
or expectations based on changing conditions or circumstances -
remaining within the framework of the guidance provided by the 
methodology, but adapting as required to facilitate systemic inquiry. 
The methodology attempts to minimize and account for external 
influences in application and interpretation. Provides sufficient 
transparency in approach, execution, and interpretation such that biases, 
assumptions, and limitations are capable of being made explicit and 
challenged within the methodology application. 
Supports a variety of applications with respect to complex systems of 
systems, including, new system design, existing system transformation, 
and assessment of existing complex system of systems initiatives. 
Capable of withstanding scrutiny with respect to: (1) identified 
linkage/basis in a body of theory and knowledge, (2) sufficient depth to 
demonstrate detailed grounding within the systems engineering 
discipline, and (3) capable of providing transparent results that are 
replicable with respect to results achieved. 
The proposed methodology within the current research involves combining tools from 
various disciplines: namely, serious gaming, risk assessment, expert elicitation, etc. Although it 
was developed within the NextGen framework, owing to its modular nature, the methodology 
may be adapted to suit different SoS level problems by modifying the embedded risk simulation 
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mechanism or employing different COTS software adequate for the system at hand. The next 
section will provide details of the developed methodology and its systemic approach. 
3.2 Gaming Cycles 
Considering the SoS engineering requirements given above, a modular, flexible, and 
consistent methodology was created. The methodology consists of three phases: pre-gaming, 
gaming, and post-gaming. Each phase is supported by 'add-ons', including formal expert 
elicitation methods and ranking tools. With the help of these tools and techniques, data (both 
quantitative and qualitative) are gathered regarding the problem at hand(Ancel, Gheorghe, & 
Jones, 2010). 
During the pre-gaming phase, it is necessary to collect all the gaming variables depending 
on the modeled system. Such variables include scenarios, stakeholders and their interactions, 
historical data regarding the system and information on the parameter(s) upon which the 
success of the transition process will be measured. The computer based simulation mechanism 
keeps track of the process throughout the gaming exercise. Depending on the application, the 
computer based simulation can evaluate risk or reliability of an infrastructure system or keep 
track of generation capacity or throughput of a certain utility. Once the adequate numerical 
simulation mechanism and all the supporting data are collected, the game is developed. 
Developing the game is an iterative process where versions are often tested by playing with 
several groups and then fine-tuning. 
The gaming cycle includes the execution of the gaming exercise with the participation of 
experts. The game usually starts with the presentation of the scenario to the participants. 
Participants are asked to perform according to their predetermined roles. Considering the new 
information they have been presented, participants are asked to make collective decisions 
about the investigated parameters. The decisions are taken as the input variables for the 
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computer assisted simulation mechanism where initial conditions for the next step are 
calculated. The iterative process enables participants to experience and shape the future phases 
of the transition process. The presence of participants (preferably experts or real stakeholders) 
social values, norms and beliefs provides the realistic input for the social interaction and the 
decision making process. 
The post-gaming phase of the methodology involves data collection and analysis which 
surfaced during the gaming cycle. At this level the elicited data are arranged and presented back 
to the participants for further analysis and feedback. Although not performed, depending on 
the type of data elicited, it is possible to use several other types of COTS software to organize 
and analyze the data. In order to illustrate the methodology described above, the example from 
the problem domain, NextGen, was given in Figure 3-1. The high level gaming architecture of the 
expert elicitation methodology within the problem domain context is given below. 
Figure 3-1 Serious Gaming Methodology - High Level Gaming Architecture 
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The problem domain is defined as 'determining the 2025 NAS safety values' by examining 
the chief safety related NextGen enabler and technologies. Within the NextGen framework, 
expert opinions and literature review provide scenarios, realistic timelines, involved 
stakeholders, technologies and other components of the infrastructure that are being modeled. 
The game cycles represent decision making milestones for these enablers. Data regarding 
enablers' characteristics (i.e. cost, benefit, timeline, equipage risk, etc.) are inputted to a risk 
simulation mechanism. This risk simulation mechanism is based upon an intuitive identification 
and prioritization approach called Rapid Risk Assessment Model (RRAM) and is adapted to the 
NextGen framework and embedded in the gaming cycle. The gathered data along with the risk 
simulation mechanism are then embedded into the serious gaming architecture. The gaming 
platform serves as the expert elicitation and aggregation arena since expert interactions from 
various stakeholder groups enable a realistic debate environment for discussion and 
examination of the social aspects of technology implementations along with technological 
aspects. The ost-gaming phase of the methodology includes data analysis and validation. The 
behavior knowledge generated throughout the gaming exercise, along with the 2010-2025 
dynamic aviation risk values and alternative ranking constitutes the outcome of the elicitation 
method. This knowledge is used as the input for the sensitivity and other analyses and becomes 
the 'elicited data' of the proposed methodology. An overview of the components within the 
method will be provided next. 
3.3 Pre-Gaming (Data Collection) 
3.3.1 Gathering Gaming Variables 
Within this section data regarding NextGen scenarios, game rules, stakeholder roles, future 
accident categories, NextGen enablers and technologies and their attributes are collected. By 
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their nature, next generation aviation technologies and other parameters carry uncertainties 
(e.g. advantages of a certain technology in 15 years, cost-benefit values, etc.). Consequently, the 
data need to be obtained mainly by eliciting expert opinions. 
For that purpose, a preliminary data gathering session based on single-point estimations 
was organized during the development stage of the game where experts provided their opinions 
regarding the benefits of future technology implementations (Cooke & Goossens, 2004). The 
gathered data was later embedded in the gaming variables. However, traditional mathematical 
expert elicitation methods are not fully suitable for this type of data generation since the data 
cannot be verified in the near future and uncertainty indications should be present. The 
literature survey concluded that the Linear Opinion Pool developed by Chytka, (2003) for the 
cases where the results remain unknown for extended periods of time, is the most suitable for 
this study18. 
Besides the technical data requirements, game designers determine the current status of 
the infrastructure system by gathering the most recent historical data in order to create an 
initial condition for the game. Such data may include but are not limited to the anticipated 
infrastructure transitioning approaches, apparent stakeholder rules (organizational structures, 
etc.), existing accident categories or other values of interest that will be tracked down, etc. 
Once the clues regarding the current status of the infrastructure and the anticipated 
transitioning approach are determined, the general outlines of the scenarios need to be created. 
The Linear Opinion Pool enables decision-makers (i.e. game builders or facilitators for this case) to 
mathematically aggregate expert opinions with the lack of likelihood functions and expert creditability 
assessments. The experts are queried regarding the unknown parameter and then asked to provide its 
uncertainty assessment rating. The results are then aggregated and distributions on each parameter are 
obtained. This methodology allows game designers to obtain data required for enabler ranking during the 
pre-gaming section. 
42 
3.3.2 Scenario Development 
Scenarios constitute one of the main elements of complex models, simulations or serious 
games. The scenario allows the modelers to create the environment in which the particular 
system operates. Similar to other gaming parameters (e.g. the technological advancement 
contributions or their timelines), the scenario to be investigated is often determined by subject 
matter experts. In order to support strategic planning efforts, workshops, serious games, think-
tanks or other behavioral expert elicitation techniques (Delphi Method, Nominal Group 
Technique, etc.) are often organized (Jacobs & Statler, 2006; Wiek, Binder, & Scholz, 2006). An 
example for such a study was conducted in 1997 by the National Research Council (National 
Research Council, 1997). Experts from academia, aviation related public and private sectors, 
scientists, consultants, the armed forces, and government agencies were able to determine five 
scenarios with great depth for the next 15 to 25 years. Out of five chosen scenarios, the aviation 
industry experienced three of the predicted futures, including the 9/11 attacks, a steep increase 
in fuel prices, and the effects of the global market in aviation. 
When constructing a scenario, the overall goal must be formed during the initial stage of 
the process. Goal formation includes the determination of the expected results, system 
boundaries, knowledge base, stakeholder functions, etc. Once the goal is clarified, the scenario 
is constructed in an iterative manner. On the other hand, developing scenarios for gaming 
purposes is highly dependent on the type of the simulation's goals. If the purpose of the game is 
to offer policy recommendations or implications, the scenario has to play a dominant role. If the 
purpose of the game is educational, the scenario must be able to promote creative thinking and 
imagination in its participants (deLeon, 1975). 
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3.4 Gaming Cycle 
3.4.1 Serious Gaming as a Way of Understanding Infrastructures 
Luna-Reyes et al. (2005) state that the presence of social and organizational factors can 
cause up to 90% of the information system project failures, resulting in not delivering the 
expected benefits. For that reason, it is crucial to integrate such societal factors into the design 
of large-scale infrastructure design processes. As mentioned in Sections 2.4 and especially 2.4.3, 
simulation gaming methods have recently shown promise in large-scale sociotechnical system 
planning efforts. Their ability to integrate the social and technical aspects of infrastructure 
development delineates these methods as the most appropriate candidate for creating a venue 
combining computer assisted stakeholder interaction. In this way, serious games provide 
insights into how to address issues arising from the interaction of players, roles, rules and 
scenarios. Mayer describes serious gaming derived applications as " [...] a hard core of whatever 
the computer model incorporated in a soft shell of gaming (usually through some form of role-
play)" (Mayer, 2009, p. 835). In order to support the case study, the RRAM described below is 
used as the hardcore computer model to measure throughout the exercise19,20. The more 
detailed demonstration of gaming methodology, Section 4.2, provides the gaming cycle 
overview within the NextGen context. 
Besides the RRAM, the commercially available decision support software, Logical Decisions® for 
Windows (LDW) v.6.2, was selected as a supportive COTS add-on. The software assists the gaming 
process by helping participants evaluate and prioritize among the available decisions they have 
throughout the game (Logical Decisions, 2007). LDW's dynamic ranking capability of various alternatives 
provides real-time support in selecting alternatives according to their parameters (e.g. cost/benefit 
values, environmental impact, implementation risks and timelines, etc.). In the light of present 
information at any given time, informed participants are encouraged to alter their value judgments, 
visualizing the tradeoffs of each option before making their decisions. 
20
 In addition to LDW, other software packages like Precision Tree® and TopRank® from Palisade 
Company were investigated for gaming support. This combination enables the graphical representation 
of possible decision outcomes gathered from the serious gaming data gathering session using decision 
trees and influence diagrams in an organized manner. TopRank® performs automated and multi-way 
"what if" sensitivity analysis for the organized decision trees identified by the gaming process. 
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3.4.2 Rapid Risk Assessment Model 
The RRAM serves as the estimation and quantification of risk values, comprised of 
separately calculated accident probabilities and their respective consequences. The probabilities 
within the model are estimated via the Probability Number Method (PNM), and the 
consequences are approximated via numerical manipulations. The RRAM is supported by 
historical and expert elicited data as well as the gaming to numerically generate the risk values 
throughout the methodology. 
The RRAM was used as the risk simulation mechanism selected for the case study. 
However, depending on the problem at hand, this model can be replaced with any adequate 
software, method, or an existing study measuring aspects like network capacity, throughput, 
financial status, etc. The adaptability of the gaming method allows developers to switch and/or 
combine different approaches which will provide a systemic view of the problem. Details 
regarding RRAM are given below. 
3.4.2.1 Introduction 
The RRAM was created through the joint effort of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNED), the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) under the 
United Nations umbrella21. The model and the associated method were developed as an 
affordable solution for a quick turn-around needed to determine risks associated with handling, 
storage, processing and transportation of hazardous materials. The risk assessment 
methodology (including the PNM approach) was supported by an extensive database containing 
various types of substances (i.e. flammable, toxic, or explosive gases or liquids), safety 
The director of this dissertation, Dr. Adrian Gheorghe, was a part of the Scientific Secretariat and 
brought in expertise regarding decoding, modifying and adapting the probability number method to the 
issue at hand. 
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precaution measures, population densities and environmental factors, etc (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 1996). However, as opposed to answering questions such as the maximum 
number of fatalities or effect of distance, the PNM induced risk assessment methodology was 
more focused on prioritization of actions in the field of emergency preparedness. 
3.4.2.2 Consequences and Probabilities 
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of an accident and its respective 
consequences (Bedford & Cooke, 2001). The IAEA study estimates probabilities and 
consequences separately. The consequences of an accident (e.g. an event caused by storage or 
transportation of certain hazardous materials) are calculated via simple numerical 
manipulations, taking into consideration the characteristics of the substance and correcting 
factors regarding the area, population density, accident geometry, etc. The required data to 
form the components of the equation is obtained through previous modeling efforts and expert 
opinions22. On the other hand, the probabilities are estimated via PNM where the probability of 
a certain accident happening is calculated via a dimensionless 'probability number', N, which is 
in turn transformed to actual probabilities. The probability number is adjusted/updated 
according to the various correcting factors. The relationship between the probability and N is 
given via N = |log10 i3 ] . The risk is defined as the product of the consequences and the 
probabilities of unwanted outcomes (hazardous events). For the NextGen case study, the 
In a similar fashion, the probability of an accident involving hazardous material storage or 
transportation is calculated via utilizing the probability numbers. An average probability number 
representing a base assumption for each case is determined then adjusted with correcting factors. These 
factors represent various categories, from the presence of safety systems and precautions to the 
operational frequency of the substance. Once the base probability number is adjusted, it can be 
converted into probabilities. The probability number method was applied to industrial applications where 
the sole consequence parameter is fatalities. However for the cases where multiple damages are present, 
methods can be used to aggregate various consequence factors. Refer to Appendix B - Probability 
Number Method (APPENDIX B- RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT MOD) for further information. 
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adequate interpretation and calculation steps were adopted and integrated which generates the 
risk simulation mechanism (see Section 4.3 for further information). 
3.4.2.3 Estimation of the Societal Risks 
The previous section provided calculations of human casualties (fatalities) associated with 
an accident, along with the probabilities of such accidents occurring. The risk to the public from 
these activities is estimated by combining these two values. The consequences are categorized 
with respect to the fatalities and the probability classes are categorized by the order of 
magnitude of the number of accidents per year (e.g. societal risk operational instrument). The 
consequence-frequency (x-y) diagram is created. The main goal is to obtain a list of activities 
whose risks have to be further analyzed before others. The risk matrix representation is one of 
the primary outcomes of the method. 
3.5 Post Gaming (Data Analysis) 
Throughout the gaming effort, the discussions and possible negotiations within the 
opposing parties are important findings that can lead to different problem solving approaches. 
The results of a game run are analyzed to examine if the gaming exercise influenced the beliefs, 
intentions, attitudes, and behavior of participants, yielding to a better understanding of 
complexity (Joldersma & Geurts, 1998). The serious gaming exercise serves both as an individual 
and collective learning platform for the stakeholders, leading to an elevated level of knowledge 
over the system (Wilson, et al., 2009). The individual learning takes place during the decision 
making process where each stakeholder group represents its respective point of view. The 
reflective conversations between the participants enable feedback and help participants build 
informed judgments. Therefore, the presence of realistic interactions among players helps the 
testing and evaluation of NextGen related technologies in the future (Joldersma & Geurts, 
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1998). Also, like individual learning, collective or organizational learning provides insight into the 
system at hand (i.e. NextGen aviation safety values). 
3.5.1 Data Collection 
Besides collective and individual learning, another main contribution of the gaming 
methodology is generated data. Considering the nature of predicting future states of complex 
infrastructure systems, fusing simulation mechanisms with the soft gaming method creates the 
best possible venue for expert elicitation for cases when the game is played with real 
stakeholder and subject matter experts. In order to collect, sort, and visualize the data, an 
intuitive but comprehensive mechanism was developed for this methodology which will be 
discussed in Section 5.2. Since the validity of the extracted data cannot be revealed until the 
future states of the system are attained, the sole way of doing so is to check the internal validity 
of the generated methodology again by using expert opinions. 
3.5.2 Expert Feedback 
Expert feedback is a main contributor in all phases of the methodology. Experts from all 
stakeholder groups help shape possible scenarios, provide numerical data regarding the future 
technological enablers and also assist in evaluating the developed methodology in different 
categories. Expert participation in all three phases of the gaming-based elicitation methodology 
is prominent since it allows game developers to constantly modify the gaming components by 
taking participant comments and recommendations into consideration. Due to the large level of 
the system, no one expert is sufficient for gathering all the data needed to develop gaming 
based on the given methodology. For that reason the methodology, provides a common 
elicitation aggregation opportunity for next generation infrastructure development. The 
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validation section further iterates the expert feedback embedded in the validation 
questionnaire given in Appendix C. 
3.6 Methodology Integration 
The sections covered within this chapter (pre-gaming, gaming, and post-gaming) constitute 
the use of several models (RRAM, PNM), methods (serious gaming, expert elicitation), COTS 
solutions (LDW, TopRank®), and data sources. It is crucial to seek seamless integration between 
the components of this methodology in order to create an efficient representation of the 
reference system. Besides the methodology components, the adequate capturing of the 
characteristics of the system (e.g. motivation for change, constraints, system context, as well as 
the societal, technical, and economic aspects.) carries vital importance for the validity of the 
generated data. Because system characteristics vary with the context, the steps the modeler 
needs to take change from problem to problem. For this reason, the adaptation of this 
methodology to other infrastructure system transitions most likely requires modifying the 
contents of the tools and approaches, yet it is important to develop a thorough balance in the 
methodology integration to capture both societal and technical aspects of large infrastructure 
transition problems. 
3.7 Validation 
The early adopters of gaming were quite skeptical of its abilities to test strategies or 
forecast developments with confidence. They concluded the major benefit of the game was to 
suggest research priorities and identify major problems related to policy and action 
requirements (Mayer, 2009). The main criticism of the field was caused by gaming's eclectic, 
diverse and interdisciplinary nature along with the lack of defining terms and concepts (Gosen & 
Washbush, 2004). However, the failure to implement sustainable infrastructure models 
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indicated that the multi-dimensional complexity of modern systems required different 
approaches and design principles (Roos, et al., 2004). As an alternative answer, research studies 
employing gaming methods increased exponentially after the 1970s (Duke, 1974)23. 
The literature review demonstrated three relevant validation definitions regarding the 
contents of this research. Peters et al. (1998) review the concept of validity under four criteria, 
as suggested by Raser (1969): psychological reality, structural validity, process validity, and 
predictive validity. Greenblat (1975) describes the types of validity related to gaming models 
wi th common sense or face validity, empirical validity, and theoretical validity. Chytka (2003) 
provides a validation triad containing performance, structural and content validities to validate 
her methodology. The common traits of these validation approaches are given in Table 3-2. 
Embarking from the definitions of Greenblat (1975) and Peters et al. (1998), face validity or 
psychological reality refer to the realistic gaming environment experienced by the participants. 
For a game to be valid, the environment must portray similar characteristics to the reference 
system. The empirical validity given by Greenblat designates the closeness of the game structure 
to the reference system. The definition given by Peters et al. separate the empirical validity into 
Although one can come across a vast amount of literature regarding the validity of experimental 
situations (internal and external validity), measurement instruments (content and construct validity), and 
the specific research method or its results, the concept of validity regarding simulation games is barely 
elaborated in the literature (Peters, Vissers, & Heijne, 1998). The validity of gaming usage was mostly 
investigated regarding its ability to enhance education and training. Researchers studied the specific 
gaming attributes that contribute to learning outcomes and evaluation of gaming methods training 
effectiveness (Feinstein & Cannon, 2002; Gosen & Washbush, 2004; Wilson, et al., 2009). Simulation 
approach received several criticisms regarding its ability to serve as an educational tool where the main 
concerns focused on internal and external validities. For the cases where the changes on the classroom 
environment or generalizability of the learning effects to outside classroom situations were problematic 
(Gosen & Washbush, 2004). Very generally, the validity within the simulation games can be given as the 
correspondence between the model and the system itself (or the reference system). However, this 
definition is not very accurate since the level of correspondence between the model and the referent 
system is unknown; it could mean that the model has to one-to-one representation of the complex 
system or only few components of the system are modeled. Additional criteria are necessary to 
distinguish the level of association between the model and the system being modeled (Peters, et al., 
1998). The conclusions reached via a simulation game should be similar to those that can be experienced 
in the real-world system (Feinstein & Cannon, 2002). 
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two sections: structural validity (covering the game structure, theory and assumptions) and 
process validity (concerning the information/resource flows, actor interactions, negotiations, 
etc.). For the simulation to be valid, all the elements of the game (actors, information, data, 
laws, norms, etc.) should be isomorphic, meaning the elements and relations do not necessarily 
have to be identical but should be able to demonstrate congruency between them. Finally, the 
last element covered by both definitions is related to the theoretical validity: the models' ability 
to reproduce historical outcomes or predict the future, and conform to existing logical 
principles. 















Chytka (2003) developed a validation triad (based on the validation square cited in 
(Pedersen, Emblemsvag, Ellen, & Mistree, 2000)) in order to assess the aggregation 
methodology which was developed within her dissertation. The aggregation methodology 
provided risk analysis in an aerospace conceptual vehicle design that relies heavily on subjective 
expert judgment which is hard to validate. Although in a different context, Chytka's validation 
24
 The validation triad consists of three components, namely, performance, structural and content 
validities. These components are elaborated within an unstructured interview process to obtain the 
validity of the methodology. The performance validity includes the efficiency of the methodology and the 
usefulness of the uncertainty representation. The structural validity is concerned with the usability and 
added value of the methodology and its applicability beyond the test case. Finally, the content validity is 
involved with the appropriateness of the aggregation method chosen for the study 
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approach was found to be relevant to the research at hand since both involve complex systems 
lacking an adequate quantitative validation possibility. 
The current research methodology relies heavily on subjective assessments obtained from 
experts at all levels (pre-gaming, gaming, and post-gaming phases). Subsequently, the 
validation parameters of the methodology require subject matter expert opinions. Validation of 
the research in this dissertation depends on subjective methods where there is no predictable, 
stable and data rich environment. Consequently, the outcomes of the methodology cannot be 
put to test (i.e. 2025 NAS safety values). The validation of the proposed methodology was 
obtained via a developed validation questionnaire which was based upon the previous works 
cited within this section. This questionnaire was supplied to the participants along with the 
preliminary game results in order to receive validation feedback. Appendix C includes the 
validation questionnaire. 
3.8 Human Subjects Research Requirements 
The described methodology involved subject matter expert participation during the 
development and execution phases. Additionally, the earlier phases of the study were funded by 
federal support which implied the review of the research by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
before any data collection in order to protect the rights and well-being of human research 
subjects.25,26 Appendix D provides the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval of informed 
consent document and use of photo/video materials for data extraction and analysis (ODU IRB 
10-157). 
The IRB examines the research to ensure compliance with Code of Federal Regulations Title 45 
Part 46 (45CFR46) and State Legislation (Virginia Code 32.1-163.16). IRB requires detailed definitions of 
the research scope, project design considerations, experimental procedures, questions and briefings 
presented to participants and contents of the informed consent document. The informed consent 
document provides information regarding the study, compensations, benefits, and potential risks along 
with precautions taken to mitigate them. The IRB requires training of researchers and responsible 





PROBLEM DOMAIN: NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
SAFETY 
NextGen implementation efforts have been used as the problem domain to demonstrate 
the developed methodology in Chapter 3. This chapter will discuss how NextGen was adapted to 
the methodology. A brief introduction to NextGen is then followed by sections on gaming cycle 
overview, data requirements, assumptions, game rules, stakeholders, and scenarios. 
4.1 NextGen Overview 
The United States' National Airspace System (NAS) is a vast, multi-layered array of 
operations covering virtually everything involving air transportation. With well over 800 million 
passengers, NAS requires input from more than 15,000 air traffic controllers to assist 590,000 
pilots on board 239,000 aircraft that take off and land at 20,000 U.S. airports. This extremely 
complex system is closely tied to the national economy, contributing $1.2 trillion annually and 
over 5 percent of the gross domestic product while generating 11 million jobs and $369 billion in 
earnings. The air transportation industry allows the positive growth of U.S. trade balance, 
enables just-in-time business models, serves businesses and helps bring friends and family 
closer (FAA, 2009). 
Within recent years, delays have heavily impacted passenger travel, and they are 
forecasted to be even higher in the future as the demand for air transportation is expected to 
increase. In addition, future airspace is expected to accommodate unmanned aircraft systems 
and commercial space vehicles as well. Furthermore, the entire system is expected to operate 
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within acceptable safety levels and environmental impact guidelines (FAA, 2009; U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2010a). 
4.1.1 NextGen Benefits 
The goal of NextGen is to make air transportation safer and more reliable while improving 
the capacity of the NAS and reducing the impact of aviation on the environment. So far, the FAA 
was able to deliver some of the projected advantages of newer technologies like Automatic 
Dependant Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). The advantage of using ADS-B over legacy airspace 
surveillance is most visible over areas like the Gulf of Mexico where radar coverage is not 
adequate. One other benefit of NextGen technologies is related to improved access to runways 
during low visibility due to weather or geographical obstacles. The Wide Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS), along with other satellite-based technologies, improved runway access for both 
large and small airports (FAA, 2010). 
Improvements to ground safety and operations are also becoming more visible, reducing 
delays around the NAS, as reported in the NextGen Implementation Plan 2010 (FAA, 2010). 
Aircraft in airports in New York, Philadelphia and Texas are enjoying runway access capabilities 
without crossing other close-by runways. Besides improved access, runway safety and airport 
efficiency is also increased via tools like Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Model X (ASDE-
X) which enabled a 50% drop on runway incursions in 2009 (FAA, 2009, 2010). 
Airspace access and safety will be re-shaped within the NextGen framework, allowing more 
direct routes, time and fuel-saving procedures, and more efficient use of the available airspace 
throughout NAS. The Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures, along with Optimized 
Profile Descents at various airports, demonstrated significant fuel reduction, shorter flight times 
and lower environmental impact with savings up to 25 gallons of fuel per landing in addition to 
the 60 to 90 gallons of fuel savings when using the Tailored Arrivals (TA) which enable pilots 
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optimal profiles from the high altitude space down to the runway level (FAA, 2010). The 
projected NAS will be able to achieve the next level of safety for the flying public while advanced 
airframe technologies, sustainable alternative fuels and new procedures will shrink aviation's 
environmental footprint to overtime (FAA, 2010). 
4.1.2 NextGen Challenges 
The complex nature of the NAS, combined with numerous operational and management 
challenges, threatens NextGen efforts. NextGen is expected to yield significant benefits in terms 
of reducing delays, saving fuel, enhancing safety and so on; however, these ambitious goals also 
pose a great source of risk with billion dollar investments from both the government and the 
airline industry. The NextGen Implementation plan requires the co-operation of the FAA with 
several partnerships and stakeholders such as airline companies, airports and manufacturers 
(FAA, 2010). However, reports from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reveal that the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is facing difficulties in developing a strategy to engage 
stakeholders, not to mention managing and integrating multiple NextGen efforts (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2010b). Also, challenges like multi-dimensional research and 
development along with complex software development, workforce changes, mixed equipage, 
and policy issues need addressing. Uncertainties and the lack of historical data related to 
shaping a future aviation system also inhibit the ability to use formal risk analysis methods and 
other vital knowledge needed by decision makers. 
There are a number of challenges that need to be tackled to achieve the increased 
capabilities described within the NextGen goals. Increasing system capacity while maintaining 
efficiency, increasing safety and still maintaining an economically viable industry is a must. 
The mixed equipage issue reveals during the transition process where the implementation 
of new technologies conflict with the existing installed counterparts. The variable maturity time 
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of interdependent projects poses challenges to NextGen planners (FAA, 2010). The early 
adopters of newer technologies will be able to experience the benefits. However, the FAA 
should still be able to accommodate the lesser equipped aircraft. Also, the cost associated with 
adopting the new technology by the aircraft operators from the airlines, general aviation or 
military should be presented with a solid business case since stakeholders would not be 
investing in new avionics if there are no services to support them. 
Even more than the associated cost, safety is a major challenge before the next generation 
air transportation. The safety aspect is the primary factor behind the design, development and 
approval process of new functions and capabilities in order to meet the required level of 
integrity (JPDO, 2008b). The JPDO's National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (NASSP) is designed 
to ensure that the safety considerations are covered within safety practices (Safety 
Management Systems throughout the industry and government) and systems (safer interfaces 
within human and autonomous interfaces within air and ground based systems). The NASSP also 
draws attention to the coordination of international policies, technologies and procedures to 
create a seamless level of safety across air transportation systems (JPDO, 2008a). 
4.2 Gaming Cycle Overview 
The gaming section of the methodology developed within this research is based on a 
platform adopted from a policy gaming play sequence from Geurts, Duke and Vermeulen (2007). 
An adapted version of the play sequence is employed to accommodate the NextGen safety 
framework (see Figure 4.1). The gaming sequence is supported by the simulation mechanism 
and COTS software described in the previous chapter. The sequence is initiated by the 
presentation of the game to the stakeholders including the game rules, general idea about 
NextGen goals and available resources. Different stakeholder groups comprised of participants 
from various backgrounds are formed, and their respective goals in the game are provided (e.g. 
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the FAA concerned with safety, commercial airlines with economic feasibility, etc.). The groups 
are asked to evaluate and select from the list of technological advancements related to safety 
enhancements. However, implementation of each intervention requires using limited resources. 
Additionally, the airlines and the government have to agree on some of the decisions due to 
their conflicting agendas. Following the discussions among participants, the next year's strategic 
decisions are inputted into the risk simulation mechanism (based upon the RRAM) and updated 
NAS risk values which constitutes the initial conditions for the next cycle. The simulation 
mechanism will also update the consequences respective to the simulated timeframe. The game 
is iterated until the desired year is reached (2025). The gaming simulation concludes with 
debriefing and discussions in order to create the foundation for data gathering and analysis. 
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-NextSen 6oals, Resources, and Game Rules are provided 
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Figure 4-1 NextGen Safety Risk Assessment Gaming Sequence 
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4.3 Adaptation of RRAM to NextGen 
The RRAM including the PNM is chosen as the backbone for the developed methodology's 
risk estimation engine due to its intuitive structure and ease of expandability. The three main 
components of the RRAM approach -consequences, probabilities and societal risks- are 
transferred to the NextGen Safety Assessment Methodology and fused with the policy gaming 
efforts provided above to develop the intuitive NextGen Safety Assessment methodology. The 
following sections will highlight the adaption and assumptions made during this transformation. 
4.3.1 Consequences 
The consequences (the x-axis of the risk matrix, see Figure 4-4) in the IAEA study were 
determined as fatalities per accident, which is a function of the affected area, population 
density and the presence of mitigation measures. In a similar way, the consequences within the 
NextGen safety assessment methodology were based on fatalities, considering that the ultimate 
goal of NextGen related safety efforts within JPDO is concerned with saving human lives. The 
consequences are estimated as a product of various components comprised of: 
• the baseline fatality rate of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 121 aviation 
(NTSB, 2010), 
• the air traffic density rate (function of t), and 
• the presence of the correcting factors regarding the survivability rate in accident 
scenarios. 
The crash survivability correcting factors (i.e. fire/smoke mitigation, survivability of aircraft 
structures, and accident response procedures) are adopted from the National Science and 
Technology Council and are provided in Table 4-1. The formula is developed to estimate 
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The y-axis of the risk matrix consists of the probabilities associated with the accident 
scenarios, resulting in the consequences described above. The probability number method does 
not calculate the probability as a frequency (e.g. x/100,000FH); this is done in two steps where 
first the probability number is constructed and then transformed into probability frequencies. 
Since the methodology is designed to evaluate the future NAS safety related technological 
developments, the correcting factors are selected mainly from NextGen JPDO's Avionics 
Roadmap (2008b) and subject matter experts within the Systems Analysis and Concepts 
Directorate (SACD). The tools, methods, and programs covered below do not constitute an 
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exhaustive list; however, efforts from both NASA and FAA guided programs are covered. Based 
on the references above, the formula to calculate the probability number, N„ is developed. 
N,=N*, +nrs + nasr + nmng + nac + nWxa + nwva 
where: 
N Calculated probability number for the system at time = t 
N *, The average probability number for the current NAS setup 
nrs Correction parameter related to runway safety and collision 
avoidance 
nmr Correction parameter for aircraft systems reliability technologies 
n Correction parameter for icing mitigation technologies 
n Correction parameter for airborne collision avoidance 
n^ Correction parameter for weather avoidance precautions 
nturb Correction parameter for turbulence (wake) avoidance solutions 
The calculated probability number Nf will be updated at each time frame and be used as 
the initial average probability number N*t for each system. The respective correcting factor 
tables for the categories will be provided next. 
4.3.3 Categories and Enabler Selection 
The categories provided above were selected based on the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) aviation accident statistics covering years 1996 - 2007 and potential accident 
areas in the future with the introduction of increased traffic within the FAA Part 121 -
Commercial Air Carrier Category. The aviation occurrence categories defined by the Commercial 
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) were also 
employed to facilitate the data gathering process (CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team, 2008). 
The enablers for each of the categories above obtained from various programs within NASA's 
Aviation Safety (NASA, 2010) and from FAA FY2011 Budget Estimates (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2010a). Information on cost, operational timeline and content were taken from 
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the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and other publications (FAA, 2010; JPDO, 
2008a, 2008b; NASA, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). The categories and the respective 
technologies/methods provided below are limited to safety related areas. The technologies 
associated with increased capacity or reduced environmental impact goals are not within the 
scope of this research. Appendix E provides detailed information on the enabler categories, 
definitions, associated costs, timeline and benefits. 
Within the gaming cycle, the selection of the enablers is done by the participants of the 
relevant stakeholder groups. Participants decide on the timeline and collaborations regarding 
the adoption of the predetermined enablers under several categories. Participants are asked to 
evaluate enabler benefits, costs, mixed equipage risk and implementation timeline, then review 
their budget and plan for the near future in order to make the decision about when to 
"purchase" the enablers and how to construct collaborations whenever it is possible. During this 
process, the Logical Decisions for Windows® (LDW) software is employed to assist the 
participants (namely airlines and airport authorities) in examining each alternative at any time-
step. Using LDW's "Dynamic Sensitivity" option under the Results tab, participants change the 
utility function parameters to determine the ranking within the enablers. The adjusted weight 
for each measure (i.e. benefit, cost, implementation timeline, and mixed equipage risk) re-
arranges the ranking of the alternatives, providing the participants with the prioritized list of 
enablers to purchase. Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 provide snapshots for enabler rankings for 
airport and airline stakeholders, respectively. 
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Figure 4-3 Airlines Enablers LDW Snapshot 
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4.3.3.1 Runway Safety and Collision Avoidance Category 
The runway safety and collision avoidance category contains accidents that occur on the 
ground. Associated CAST/ICAO definitions for this category are Ground Handling (RAMP), 
Ground Collision (GCOL), Runway Incursion - Animal (Rl-A), and Runway Incursion - Vehicle, 
Aircraft or Person (RI-VAP). This category is divided into 2 sub-categories: Rl - Capacity/Safety 
Related Runway Enablers and R2 - Runway Visibility. Respective NextGen and other 
technologies/methodologies in order to reduce accidents observed within the Rl category are: 
Airport Surface Detection Equipment- Model X (ASDE-X), and Runway Incursion Reduction 
Program. The R2 category includes the Runway Status Lights (RWSL), Moving Maps, Terminal 
Area Hazard Sensor, and Automatic Surveillance- Broadcast (ADS-B) (as the key enabler 
technology which is the prerequisite for ASDE-X). 
4.3.3.2 Aircraft Systems Reliability Category 
This category contains accidents related to system component, failure or malfunction of 
aircraft. It is divided into three categories, comprised of Powerplant, Structure, and Software & 
Systems (A/Cl, A/C2, A/C3). NextGen technologies and mitigation measures for A/Cl category 
are: Propulsion Health Management System, Aircraft Catastrophic Failure Research; for A/C2 
category: Airframe Health Management System, Continued Airworthiness for Airframe 
Structures; and for A/C3 category: Software Health Management System and Aircraft Systems 
Health Management System. 
4.3.3.3 Icing Mitigation Category 
Although icing is not considered a safety hazard within the current air transportation 
infrastructure (with less than 1% of accidents occurring within the timeframe), this category is 
included in the framework since the increased NextGen capacity eventually will require flying in 
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potentially icy flight envelopes. The icing mitigation category is divided up to two sub-
categories; icing occurring on aircraft structures (i.e. aerodynamics and control surfaces) and 
engine icing, I I and 12, respectively. Future technologies/methodologies aiming to mitigate icing 
in category I I are Iced Airframe Aerodynamics Modeling and Prediction Methods, Icing Remote 
Sensing, and Atmospheric Hazards - Icing. Icing category 12 enablers are External Hazards-
Icing, Engine Icing Modeling, Advanced Sensors and Materials. 
4.3.3.4 Airborne Collision Avoidance Category 
The airborne collision avoidance category is related to mid-air collisions (MAC), near mid-air 
collisions (NMAC), TCAS alerts, loss of separation and potential loss of separation occurrences. 
Similar to icing accidents, within the timeframe there hasn't been a mid-air collision. Also, the 
near-mid air collisions and loss of separation incidents are around 1% of total accidents. Given 
the assumption that future aviation will have a higher level of NMAC, MAC and Loss of 
Separation due to increased capacity, these values are taken from the incident database for the 
same period of time. The airborne collision avoidance category is divided into two main 
categories, NMAC (CI) and Loss of Separation (C2). The technologies to mitigate risk of mid-air 
collision are enhancements to TCAS for category CI. Category C2 enhancements are Loss of 
Separation Assurance and Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) for Global Positioning 
System (GPS). The Loss of Separation Assurance technology requires ADS-B technology to be 
acquired. 
4.3.3.5 Weather (Thunderstorm) Avoidance Category 
The weather avoidance category is comprised of accidents related to the presence of 
thunderstorm or lightning (WSTRW) as the primary cause and the controlled flight into terrain 
(CFIT) due to low visibility. The two categories within the Weather related accidents are 
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Thunderstorm (Wl) and Visibility (W2). One of the anticipated technologies to prevent weather 
related accidents for the W l category is Integrated Weather in the Cockpit enabler which 
requires Data Link enhancements to be in place. Accidents related to weather related visibility 
will be improved by the integration of Synthetic Vision to the aircraft fleet. 
4.3.3.6 Turbulence Avoidance Category 
The final category is turbulence (wake) avoidance. According to collected data, the wake 
turbulence is the primary cause for aircraft accidents. The category is split into two sub-
categories: in flight turbulence encounter, (Category Tl) and ground wake vortices (Category 
T2). The Forward Looking Interferometer, Aircraft Wake Database, Wake and Wind Based 
Procedures are methods and technologies under development to mitigate turbulence in flight 
(Tl). Wake Turbulence Mitigation for Arrivals and Departures will be implemented for Category 
T2 type accidents. 
4.3.4 Probability, Severity Definitions, and Risk Matrix Thresholds 
The risk matrix and respected definitions that are used within the methodology are 
adopted from the FAA's Safety Management System Manual (FAA, 2008). This graphical means 
of determining risk levels is chosen since the methodology aims to calculate the likelihood 
(probability) and the severity (consequences) for each risk independently where the risk is the 
product of these two (Figure 4-4). The 'traffic light' approach (or ALARA principle) is taken 
where the red areas demonstrate the unacceptable risk areas, caused by an event carrying 
catastrophic consequences, major consequences with a high likelihood value. The yellow and 
green areas signify the medium and low risk levels, respectively. The definitions of the x and y-
axis are given within the following tables (Table 4-2 and Table 4-3) in the context of NextGen 
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Figure 4-4 Risk Matrix Adapted from FAA (FAA, 2008) 
The severity levels are defined based upon the FAA risk definitions, on the five-point Likert 
scale, ranging from minimal to catastrophic. The historical average of 0.291 fatalities per 
100,000 flight hours is taken from the NTSB website (2000-2009) and is assumed to be a minor 
risk that the aviation industry inherently carries. The consequences axis on the matrix 
demonstration will have the two extremes on the x-axis. 
Since there have been years without any fatalities within the FAR Part 121, the lower-end 
of the axis is assigned as '0'. The upper end of the scale is the worst-case scenario where there 
are no crash survivability efforts in 2025 where the NAS air traffic density is 2.5 times the 
current density. Within this setup, the threshold value for catastrophic consequences will be: 
C2025= 0.291x2.5x1 = 0.727.(Table 4-2). 
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Similarly, the probability axis values are given in Table 4-3 where the probability ranges 
from frequent to extremely improbable. Since the methodology is focused on estimating the 
overall NAS accidents causing fatalities, the FAA's quantitative probability definition for NAS 
systems and ATC Operational definitions are adopted. Also, the corresponding probability 
numbers are calculated and given in the table. The baseline accident rates (0.208/100,000FH for 
2000-2009) indicate an initial average of N: 5.681 (Remote) before any NextGen related 
technology implementation is present^ 0 208/ 
, /ooooo = 5 681 . This results in a 'Low Risk' area, the 
intersection of severity 4 and likelihood C. 
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4.4 Data Requirements 
In order to support the decision making process, various data sources have been used 
throughout the methodology. Due to the nature of the problem at hand, a combination of 
numerical and elicited data has been used in various sections. Historical data concerning the 
current aviation accident rates and fatalities for FAA Part 121 are taken from NTSB general 
aviation statistics (NTSB, 2010) and the Aviation Accident and Incident Data System. This 
database was obtained from the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
department of the FAA's Office of Aviation Safety in April 200927. Within the database, the most 
current detailed categorization of aviation accident and incident data was up to 2006; however 
27
 Data gathered by Joni Evans at NASA Langley Research Center, May 25th, 2010 
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the NTSB website contained accident values up to year 2009. In both cases, for the average 
calculation, the past 10 years were taken into consideration. Appendix F outlines the data 
obtained from the NTSB website and Aviation Accident and Incident Data System. 
The serious gaming exercise also required intense SME participation due to lack of data 
regarding future NAS systems. For most cases, the benefits of future enablers were solely based 
on SME opinions. In order to acquire such data, a meeting with experts from NASA Langley 
Research Center was held, and opinions were gathered in an informal brainstorming session, 
and a single point value for each enabler was collected. 
Besides the incident/accident related data, current airline and airport financial data are also 
extracted in order to create a realistic baseline for the gaming activity. For that purpose, the 
eight largest airports and airline companies are selected, and their financial data are taken as 
baseline. The airports are selected according to the passenger enplanement in 2009. The hub 
airports and the financial data are obtained from the FAA Compliance Activity Tracking System 
(CATS) - Summary Report 127,28 and the summary is given in Table 4-4. The non-operating 
revenues and expenses such as interest income, grant receipts and capital expenditures and 
debts are excluded from the source data. 
http://cats.airports.faa.gov/Reports/reports.cfm 
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Table 4-4 Hub Airports Financial Data 
Hartsfield-Jackson 
Atlanta Int'l (ATI) 
£Mcag»0ilMM Intl 
Los Angeles Int'l (tAX) 
Dallas fotftftterthMI 
M i M M 
- 6eorg#iu#r'J* 
Intercontinental - * • 
Houston (IAH) 
Las Vegas-McCarran 






















































Similarly, the airline companies with the highest annual operating revenue are selected and 
their financial information was obtained from the Research and Innovative Technology 
Administration (RITA) Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) website29. Two separate 
databases are employed in order to obtain various airline data such as transport revenues (Air 
Carrier Financial - Schedule P-1.2)30 and (Air Carrier Financial Schedule P.12)31 fuel consumption. 
Schedule P-1.2 database allowed extracting airline specific passenger baggage fees, 
' http://www.transtats.bts.eov/databases.asp7Mode ID=l&Mode Desc=Aviation&Subject ID2=0 
1
 http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp7Table ID=295 
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp7Table ID=294 
transportation fees, reservation cancellation fees and other incomes along with expenses like 
maintenance, flying operation and maintenance. The schedule P.12 database provided airline 
specific fuel cost and fuel consumption, leading to average fuel prices for the past 5 years. An 
overview of the largest air carriers and their financial information is given in Table 4-5. The 
airlines considered within the simulation are Delta Airlines, Southwest Airlines, United Airlines, 
U.S. Airways, Northwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Continental Airlines, American, Alaska and 
Airtran Airways. Due to the high volatility in corporate airline finances, non-operating income 
and expenses including capital gains and losses and interest expenses are excluded from the 
financial data. 

































































The ten largest corporate airlines are represented as a single entity for purposes of 
simplicity. On average, between the years 2005 and 2009, the depicted airlines made up 70% of 
enplanements in the domestic market. At the time of developing the methodology, 2010 values 
71 
were not complete. Table 4-6 outlines the specific enplanements for the major airlines and their 
ratio with respect to the total NAS passenger capacity. The data was obtained from the T-100 
Domestic Market (U.S. Carriers)32 which can be found on the BTS website. The financial data for 
the airline companies are handled collectively, and their five year averages (2005 - 2009) are 
adopted as the initial conditions for the gaming exercise. 
Table 4-6 Major U.S. Airlines Enplanements 
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The risk classification and prioritization methodology presented in Section 3.4.2 consists of 
accidents occurring in complex industrial systems (handling, storage, and transportation of 
hazardous materials like flammables, explosives and toxic gases and liquids). The approach 
within the original methodology is geared towards supporting the upper risk management with 
system-level risk assessment. For that reason, the probability and consequences calculations 
contain a large number of assumptions, limiting the methods to be solely risk prioritization for 
further analysis. The adaption of this approach to the NextGen framework also required a fair 
amount of simplifications and assumptions in order to focus on the NAS level risk characteristics. 
Since the timeframe for this method involves over 15 years the technologies, their implications, 
benefits and costs are mainly provided by the small number of SMEs that took part in the 
collaboration33,34. 
4.6 Game Rules 
Each serious game is a dedicated simulation gaming exercise, specifically tailored-made and 
designed for the problem at hand. The actual run of the serious game is a collective and 
interactive process designed by the very owners of the problem: "Through the unique 
combination of simulation with role-playing, participants themselves actually create the future 
that they want to study, rather than it being produced for them as in projects where formal 
The probability number calculation components were collected based on the NextGen JPDO 
Avionics Roadmap (JPDO, 2008b). The roadmap is constructed by drawing materials from NextGen 
planning sources in order to communicate the proposed NextGen capabilities and improvements 
corresponding avionics overtime. The correcting factors located in the probability number calculations are 
selected upon the Safety Enhancement/Hazard Avoidance and Mitigation section in the roadmap and the 
general expertise of participating experts related to NextGen safety 
In calculating the consequences axis, only fatalities related to FAR Part 121 were taken into 
consideration. However other consequences like accidents, serious injuries, hull losses and accident 
related costs were not included since data for a 15-year long timeframe for every future scenario would 
be burdensome to collect in a meaningful manner. For that reason, consequences were constructed only 
with fatality data from past 10 years, projected NAS capacity increase, and planned measures to increase 
survivability rate in case of crashes 
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simulation models were used" (Geurts, et al., 2007, p. 536). However, unlike in many strategic 
seminars, serious gaming allows participants to engage by creating and analyzing the results of 
their decisions in a safe environment. At this point, the laying out of the game rules plays a very 
important role. Rigid and rule-based gaming works well for well-structured environments like 
military gaming. This type of gaming is based on specific rule-sets, formalized by mathematical 
and/or computational methods. The rigid-type rule-sets are successful when the problem at 
hand is well-defined and understood like oligopolistic market settings. 
On the other hand, in social arenas with public and intense stakeholder interactions where 
firm rules do not exist, free form gaming is more suitable (Mayer, 2009). Free form gaming, 
initially implemented in the 1950s at the Social Science Division at RAND, is also known as 
seminar gaming or political-military gaming. During game play, positions, objects and rules can 
be challenged, modified, and improved by players. The game needs to be carefully monitored by 
a control team, mostly experts, acting like referees or game directors. This type of gaming 
requires a high level of subject matter expert input and experienced players within a carefully 
crafted scenario setting. As stated previously, each game is designed specifically to serve a 
purpose (solve a problem, provide insights, reach a consensus, etc.) and the gaming rules have 
to be specifically tailored to this purpose. 
Within the scope of this project, the primary goal is to provide insights into future NAS 
safety and data gathering regarding future systems. For that reason, a combination of rigid and 
free form gaming rules was employed. However, unlike a traditional policy gaming exercise, the 
end state of the aviation safety within the NextGen framework is somehow determined, i.e. 
cutting the aviation fatality risks by 2025 (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2010a). The goal 
of the serious game is to simulate the aviation safety values within the timeframe while taking 
into consideration the technological constraints (cost/benefit, feasibility, mixed equipage, etc.) 
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and behavioral concerns (information overload to pilots, controllers as well as early technology 
adopters). For that reason, a nominal number of stakeholder rules are determined to help guide 
the stakeholder interactions (e.g. the FAA mandating Corporate Airlines or Airport Operators to 
adopt certain technologies, etc.), reflecting real-world relationships. Figure 4-5 provides a basic 
stakeholder rule schematic outlining the common ground rules regarding engagement rules. 
mandates safety 8s 
noise requirements from 
/ affects the air 
/ transportation capacity / / / • 
"Determines the US 
affects the air Economy and 
transportation capacity Terror Threat 
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Airport Operators _ /__ adjusts airline \ / landing fees for \ 
/ 
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demands safe air mandates 
transportation from (automotion) safety from
 a d j u s t t a X g S f o r 





Determine the \ 
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'Government / FAA / Military]* Terror Threat, Fuel Prices -
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 anC| Government Participation 
Scenano Variables 
Exogenous Factors 
Figure 4-5 Basic Stakeholder Rules 
However, in order for experts from various stakeholder groups to reveal hidden 
complications caused by social factors, the bounding stakeholder rules should be kept to a 
minimum. Also, due to the nature of the participants, their expertise will help game directors 
modify certain rules, allowing the serious gaming model to expand and became more realistic 
after each session. 
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4.7 Stakeholders 
One of the most productive outcomes of the policy gaming exercises is the participants' 
interaction with the problem at hand. The 'safe' environment allows participants to create and 
analyze the complexity by communicating various aspects of the issue among the stakeholders. 
As Duke (1980) argued, real-world complex problems often include a sociopolitical context, 
created by the idiosyncratic or irrational 'players' present during the decision-making process. 
Stakeholder identification is crucial to managing projects involving complex technical aspects, 
and it is also necessary to understand and articulate individual or collective goals along with 
interaction dynamics before conducting any further research (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2003). 
Determining the relevant participants, their value demands and expectations also has to be a 
part of the equation, especially considering the complexity of the system involving socio-
economic, behavioral and human dimension aspects of the problem (Brewer, 2007). 
Consequently, the large-scale transformation of the NAS also harbors various stakeholders with 
diverse agendas that can directly or indirectly affect the decision-making process. In order to 
model such a dynamic environment, a simplified list of involved stakeholders and engagement 
rules were developed. The interested parties given within Table 4-7 have primary (and often 
conflicting) goals and resources that will be unfolded throughout the gaming exercise (Sherry, et 
al., 2005). Each stakeholder group is represented by three experts who determine the strategy 
that is followed throughout the game. Chytka (2003) argues that adding more experts within 
each group will not improve efficiency and effectiveness of the data gathered. 
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Table 4-7 Stakeholders list and their primary objectives 
Government, FAA and Military 
Objective: safety, protect and 
nurture aviation industry, throughput 
Airport Operators 
Objective: throughput, revenue neutral, 
safety 
Corporate Airlines 
Objective: Market share, profit, 
throughput 
Public 
Objective: Affordable and safe 
transportation 
4.7.1 Government, FAA and Military Stakeholder 
This stakeholder group represents the "big brother" role over the airports and airlines. The 
government is responsible for determining tax values for various areas such as income, 
environmental and security, along with aviation fuel tax. The players representing this 
stakeholder must behave according to the scenario; however, they are encouraged to take 
initiatives to promote the acquisition of certain NextGen enablers and overall NAS safety. The 
FAA's role as the enforcer of aviation safety is also controlled by this stakeholder. By closely 
monitoring the yearly changes at the Risk Matrix, government/FAA can intervene with airline 
and airport pricing and acquisition plans. They also have the ability to spare funds for assisting 
airlines and airports in purchasing large-ticket items such as ADS-B and Data Link enablers. The 
final task of this stakeholder is to reflect the military agenda based on the scenario presented 
(i.e. the adjustments required for UAS integration to NAS). It is desirable that this scenario is 
represented by players with a background in government, the military and FAA certification 
experience. 
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4.7.2 Corporate Airlines 
The representative group for corporate airlines determines the yearly average ticket prices, 
the reservation cancellation fees and passenger baggage fees. Their finances are directly 
affected by the strategies followed by other stakeholders, i.e. airports collect landing fees and 
the government collects various taxes. Airlines are also affected by the predetermined scenario 
mandating aircraft jet fuel before taxes or global terrorist threats. Airlines are encouraged to 
engage in coalitions with other stakeholders and invest funds in NextGen enablers and 
technologies because they are the primary beneficiaries of the increase in NAS capacity. 
Corporate airlines are expected to reflect their expenses in passenger ticket prices and fees; 
however, the general public stakeholder can react to increased ticket prices by choosing other 
modes of transportation. 
4.7.3 Airport Operators 
The airport stakeholder represents the main hub airports in the continental U.S.. These 
airports were listed in Table 4-4. Unlike airline companies, the airport's financial information 
only reflects the 2009 data, and the averages of 10 airports are taken into consideration as the 
baseline for the gaming exercise. In other words, the airport operator stakeholder represents 
only one U.S. hub whereas the corporate airlines represent the ensemble of the eight largest 
airlines in the United States. Like the airlines stakeholder, airport operators interact with other 
players in determining their strategies and pricing. Airport authorities decide on aeronautical 
and non-aeronautical fees. Aeronautical fees include airport landing fees that a passenger 
facility charges that are billed to airline companies. Non-aeronautical fees include expenses 
geared towards passengers such as parking fees, concession fees, airport shop rental fees, etc. 
Airports are bound to pay income and security taxes, as determined by the government 
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stakeholder. Since NextGen enablers allow airports to increase their landing capacities, players 
representing the airports are inherently motivated to invest in these technologies. 
4.7.4 General Public 
The general public stakeholder indirectly works with the game master in order to 
determine the "actual" air transportation capacity. This stakeholder reviews the information 
available regarding various forms of transportation and determines if he/she agrees with the 
projected air traffic capacity. The "Public Announcement Dashboard" provides updated 
information on cost of travel by air, train and car on two pilot routes (Washington, DC to New 
York, NY and Washington, DC to Boston, MA). At the end of each time step (i.e. simulated year), 
the public stakeholder decides whether to agree or adjust the projected air transportation 
capacity from -10% to 10% with 5% intervals. The general public stakeholder can reflect upon 
the increased the air transportation costs that were decided by airport and airline stakeholders. 
By modifying that specific year's air transportation capacity, the general public is included in 
determining the air transportation capacity. The information packages available to the public 
are U.S. economic competitiveness, threats to global security, transportation costs for the three 
aforementioned modes, and the evolving transportation environment (introduction of high 
speed rail systems and other modes). The goal in including the general public in the game is to 
be able to capture the irrational stakeholder behavior that could be portrayed by the general 
public. 
4.8 Scenarios 
The gaming exercise requires a dynamic environment to enable participants (or agents) to 
interact with each other. The dynamic scenario enables game masters or decision makers to 
evaluate various scenarios and extract the collective response from all the stakeholders. For 
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gaming purposes, a previous study conducted by the National Research Council (NRC) 
concerning scenario-based strategic planning is used as a baseline for the required scenarios 
(National Research Council, 1997). The study involved a workshop performed by NRC to help 
guide NASA's strategic planning processes. The workshop was organized with the help of NASA's 
Office of Aeronautics, The Futures Group (TFG) and the Systems Technology Group of Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC). In addition, experts from industry, academia and 
the military participated in the study to determine five long-term distinguished scenarios. 
Scenarios are based on economic, social and policy issues and became the dimensions (or 
attributes) of each scenario. Based upon the NRC study, the following table depicting the 
scenario environment for each year is determined and tested with the gaming session that took 
place on February 14th, 2011 (Table 4-8). The scenario is provided as the initial conditions for 
each year's discussions; however, the final values for the base fuel price or air transportation 
capacity are determined by the players. 
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4.9 Gaming Sequence 
As previously demonstrated in Figure 4-1, gaming takes place in a sequential manner. 
Stakeholders are given time to evaluate their options by simulating their finances for each time-
step. At the end of the short decision making period, the strategies (fees, enabler acquisition 
and other variables) are revealed in order. Each stakeholder group possesses an Excel 
spreadsheet enabling it to calculate its budget variables (airline ticket fees, landing fees, etc.) 
and is required to spare funds for the upcoming NextGen related enabler expenses. On the 
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other hand, since each participant group affects other's finances, a pre-determined amount of 
time is allowed for groups to discuss and revise their previous assessments and strategies. The 
following steps are followed during the game. 
1. The game master announces the variables of the specific calendar year including 
the anticipated air transportation capacity, political, economical, social 
environments and the untaxed fuel price. See Table 4-8 Scenario Environment by 
Year. 
Figure 4-6 Snapshot from a Gaming Exercise 
2. According to predictions for the following year, participants experiment with their 
variables and simulate their budgets using the provided personalized Excel 
spreadsheets, allowing them to determine the funds that can be used for NextGen 
enablers. 
3. The participants are given 5 minutes to discuss the enabler acquisition strategy and 
possible coalitions, including the prerequisite enablers like ADS-B or Data Link. 
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4. The round starts with the government's announcement of taxes for the coming 
year, in accordance with the political and economic environment (government 
participation level and U.S. economic state). 
5. The participants representing airport authorities announce their landing fees and 
concession fees, along with the enablers they are willing to purchase this year. 
6. The airline stakeholders announce their variables: passenger ticket fees, 
reservation cancellation fees, baggage fees and the planned NextGen enabler 
acquisitions 
7. Another 5 minutes are allowed for stakeholders to discuss their fees before they 
are announced to the game master, and the risk values for the specific year are 
calculated 
8. Once the "new air transportation environment" is revealed, the general public 
stakeholder examines the cost for various modes of transportation along with the 
safety of air travel and determines the final air transportation capacity by adjusting 
the previously announced anticipated capacity. Adjustments can be done from -
10% to 10% change with 5% increments. 
9. With the "actual" passenger capacity determined, stakeholder budgets are 
adjusted, and the following year's variables are stated by the game master, and 
another round is initiated beginning with step number 1. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
Throughout the gaming effort, discussions and possible negotiations within the opposing 
parties are important findings that can lead to different constructive problem solving 
approaches. The serious gaming exercise serves both as an individual and collective learning 
platform for stakeholders, leading to an elevated level of knowledge of the system. Individual 
learning takes place during the decision making process where each stakeholder group 
represents its respective point of view. The reflective conversations between participants enable 
feedback and help participants make informed judgments. Therefore, the presence of realistic 
interactions among players helps testing and evaluation of NextGen related technologies in the 
future (Joldersma & Geurts, 1998). Also, besides individual learning, collective learning, or 
organizational learning provides insight regarding the system at hand (i.e. the NextGen aviation 
safety values). 
One of the most tangible outcomes of the gaming exercise is the 2025 NAS safety values 
with respect to the FAA's Risk Matrix (Figure 4-4) acceptability measures. Also, the intermediate 
risk values during the technology implementation phase (for the next 15 years) are also 
calculated under the same assumptions. The cumulative effect of various safety related 
technological implementations are examined, enabling decision makers to define technologies 
or areas that require further analysis and understanding. 
There are three venues of data collection throughout the serious gaming exercise. The 
entire session is video recorded in order to observe discussions that took place between players. 
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Also, discussions among the stakeholders regarding pricing or behavioral strategies, negotiations 
and other interactions are followed by the game master and facilitators. Without disturbing the 
flow of the game, questions originating from the facilitator or the game master regarding certain 
decisions allow the collection of behavioral information. 
The second type of data is the numerical data, originated from the decisions given by the 
participants regarding NextGen enabler acquisition timeline, coalitions formed, and pricing 
strategies. This allows the observation of stakeholder reactions through their pricing strategies 
with respect to the changing scenario. By observing the graphics, it may be possible to single out 
cause-and-effect relationships to better comprehend the complex decision making 
environment. 
The third and final data source comes from the debriefing and questionnaire section 
following the gaming exercise. At this point, specially crafted questions are directed to the 
participants in order to give them the opportunity to express themselves and provide facilitators 
with the reasoning behind their decisions. Also, data regarding the validation of the 
methodology is collected via questionnaires. 
5.2 Data Collection Mechanism 
In order to aggregate and process the data, the serious gaming platform presented within 
the previous chapter is coupled with the data aggregation platform, a designated, 
comprehensive Excel® file assigned to calculate and communicate the dynamic NAS Risk values 
and other statistics among players, facilitators and game masters. The data aggregation 
platform contains all the financial relationships, accident statistics and risk assessment model 
calculations necessary to generate interim safety values and other statistics. 
Figure 5-1 provides an overview of the data elicitation mechanism developed within the 
current research methodology. The serious gaming platform promotes a challenging and 
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engaging environment for discussion and decision making. The discussions and strategic 
behaviors, along with decisions like pricing, taxation, or enabler acquisitions are followed by 
game facilitators and recorded on video for further analysis. 
Similar to the qualitative data, quantitative data are also collected and recorded via the 
Excel spreadsheet operated by the game master. The file contains numerous sections including 
stakeholder tabs (called dashboards), a risk calculation (PNM) tab, a technological enablers tab, 
and the accident database. Each tab is connected to the others; e.g. aircraft landing fees 
charged by airports are shown as an expense on the corporate airline dashboard, enabler 
acquisitions provide increased on safety levels on the Risk Matrix tab, etc. The developed 
database stemmed from system variables (NAS capacity, risk, taxation values, budgets, 
participation, etc.) enables the regeneration of the graphics given within this section. 
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Figure 5-1 Data Elicitation Mechanism 
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5.3 Sample Data and Generic Scenarios 
As previously stated, transactions between players allow numerical data gathering 
regarding the various variables in the game. Although the participants are bounded to the limits 
of certain predetermined scenario guidelines, the numerical value for the variables is completely 
determined throughout the game. For instance, the government stakeholder determines the 
income, environmental, security and fuel taxes but he/she will only apply, raise or lower these 
values according to the scenario. That way, it is possible to observe the effects of the scenario 
among the players. The scenario-sets stated in Table 4-8 are for demonstration purposes only, 
and they provide a baseline for testing the developed methodology. 
5.3.1 "Pushing the Envelope" 
One of the most tangible outcomes of the gaming exercise is the simulated NAS safety 
values for the 15-year time interval from 2010 to 2025. As previously demonstrated, the 
severity and the likelihood values for the risk construct originate from the PNM approach using 
the initial conditions obtained from historical data. The modified risk matrix in Figure 5-2 shows 
the evolution of NAS safety with time. Based upon the assumptions, the 2010 safety level is 
described with remote accident likelihood and minimal severity. Starting from year 2010, the 
anticipated air transportation capacity increase takes the accident likelihood towards 
"probable" where accident severity is also seen with "minor" consequences. This scenario is 
called "Pushing the Envelope," and the situation reflects the steep increase anticipated by FAA's 
2010 Fiscal year. This scenario depicts a continuously growing strong economy and a liberal 
trade policy environment, allowing stakeholders to regulate the market. During this scenario, 
stakeholders are required to invest in transportation infrastructure components like ADS-B 
initiation, Data Link setup and many other enablers to accommodate the anticipated increase in 
air travel. As expected, several NextGen safety related technologies and management strategies 
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are initiated by stakeholders; however, their benefits don't surface immediately. For that 
reason, the NAS safety value migrates towards the upper-left corner of the grid. 
5.3.2 "Grounded" 
In years 2015 and 2016, the air transportation capacity is largely hampered by a scenario-
driven series of terrorist attacks. This scenario was generated by the NRC study from 1997, 
somehow portraying the September 2011 events. Within the NRC study, terrorist attacks are 
caused by large gap between the income levels and living standard of developed nations 
compared to second or third world countries. The scenario for these two years is called 
"Grounded" where air travel is no longer safe, hence the decreased capacity (down to 40% of 
2010 values). Decreased NAS capacity results in lower accident risk; yet, random acts of violence 
against air transportation affects the stakeholders since very expensive security measures are 
required to encounter the terror threat (Figure 5-2). In addition, the income loss caused by 
decreased passenger capacity coupled with planned NextGen acquisition costs lead to airport 
and corporate airline budget deficits that can be observed in the following figures. 
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Figure 5-2 Evolution of NAS Safety Values with Time 
5.3.3 "Regional Tensions" 
The third simulated scenario is called "Regional Tensions" in order to represent a changing 
global scenario where harmonious globalization is no longer available. Although demand for 
aeronautics products and services is back up, increased oil cost deeply affects airline companies. 
Also, stakeholders are obliged to spare funds for military initiated Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) programs, helping to keep the elevated terror level down. Due to the initial NextGen 
enabler investments, the NAS safety values are better compared to baseline 2010 levels with 
less likelihood of accident. For the years 2017 to 2020, the increase in air transportation capacity 
does not deteriorate NAS safety. Even with a considerable terrorist attack risk, air 
transportation is rather stable and safe (Figure 5-2). 
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5.3.4 "Environmentally Challenged" 
The "Environmentally Challenged" scenario initiated in 2022 simulates a very C02 conscious 
world. At that time, conclusive evidence shows that carbon dioxide harms the planet. For that 
reason, carbon based fuel usage is very limited and resources are very costly. With their large 
area and heavy dependency on the use of transportation systems, developed nations face strict 
regulations. High fuel prices hamper the demand for aerospace products and services where the 
passenger capacity growth is small. That causes the increased consumer prices for all 
transportation modes due to higher taxes on fuel. Airline companies tend to acquire larger 
aircraft with higher load factors while decreasing flight frequency in order to reduce fuel usage. 
Nevertheless, the NAS safety values start to migrate towards the unacceptable areas due to 
increased capacity levels, but the unfavorable economic environment prevents further capacity 
growth, and final air transportation safety values stay within the acceptable limits. At the end of 
2025, the likelihood of an accident stays within the "remote" area; however, the consequences 
of any aircraft related accident are now major due to increased passenger capacity of each 
aircraft (Figure 5-2). 
5.3.5 Stakeholder Specific Variables 
5.3.5.1 Government Stakeholder Variables 
The government stakeholder fulfills various roles including the military and the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA). The main goal of this stakeholder is to adjust tax values and 
ensure NAS safety at all times. Also, during the increased terrorist activity levels, the military is 
intended to take actions and make changes to the existing NAS, causing other stakeholders to 
cooperate. The FAA (through government funding) can also initiate or mandate the acquisitions 
91 
of certain enablers if it is deemed necessary by the participants. However, the majority of 
government stakeholder actions are driven from the NRC scenarios. 
The government variables (income tax, environmental tax, security tax, and fuel tax) are 
given in Figure 5-3. As expected, during the "Pushing the Envelope" era (2010 - 2014), the U.S. 
economy is strong and tax rates are relatively low, since there are no terrorist or environmental 
concerns, there is no taxation on these areas. Furthermore, the end of year balance for the 
government stakeholder shows no significant increase, allowing airports and airlines to invest in 
NextGen technologies (Figure 5-4). Although the participant representing the government 
stakeholder did not provide any assistance with ADS-B acquisition, the low tax rates supported 
the other stakeholders. When asked for the motivation behind this behavior, the participant 
responded that he/she wanted to see a common initiative from the corporate airlines/airports 
before supporting the new technology acquisition. During discussions regarding the Data Link 
enabler acquisition, the participant representing the government stakeholder decided to 
provide $100 million to assist the corporate airline stakeholder. Both ADS-B and Data Link 
enabler costs were above the budget limit of any stakeholder, requiring a coalition. The surfaced 
coalition was between airline/airport and airline/government for ADS-B and Datalink, 
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Figure 5-3 Government Variables - Taxes and Total Fuel Price 
In the introduction of "Grounded" scenario, the air transportation industry faces a steep 
increase in security and income taxes in order to compensate for elevated global terror risk and 
declining economic status. During the "Regional Tensions" era, the security threat remains 
stable, with constant increase in income taxes and a slight increase in environmental taxes. The 
fuel tax rate is kept constant since at the time of writing, this tax was planned to be abandoned. 
Due to the decline in U.S. economic competitiveness and the disruption of today's global 
structure, starting from year 2017, the government starts to collect taxes from air 
transportation stakeholders. Fluctuations in the government end-of-year balance are caused by 
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Figure 5-4 Government Financial Data vs. Capacity 
5.3.5.2 Airport Stakeholders 
Airport stakeholders represent the finances of one large hub airport which is the average of 
the largest eight airports in the United States. The main operating revenue for the airport 
operators are aeronautical revenues (passenger airline landing fees, terminal arrival fees, rents 
and utilities), and non-aeronautical revenues (terminal food and beverage, retail stores and duty 
free). Operating expenses such as personnel compensation, supplies, and insurance costs were 
included in the calculations; however, the airport stakeholder does not have any control over 
these expenses. The operating expenses are assumed proportional to passenger capacity. 
Figure 5-5 outlines the airport variables and the capacity change. As anticipated, during the 
competitive air transportation environment (2010 - 2014), airport charges are rather constant, 
94 
and they are generating low income for airports (Figure 5-6). During the "Grounded" era, the 
fees climb in order to compensate for increased governmental taxes and increased NextGen 
related expenses. Starting in 2017 and until 2022, airports raise fees constantly mostly because 
air transportation remains the main choice of transportation in the United States. During this 
time, airport and corporate stakeholder representatives exchanged pricing information in order 
to determine their strategies. Due to the competition between the participants, the airport 
stakeholder increased the landing fees towards the end of the game when the air transportation 
capacity reached around 185% of the 2010 values. 
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Figure 5-6 Airport Financial Data vs. Capacity 
Examining the difference between the available balance and the end-of-year balance, it is 
understood that the NextGen enabler acquisitions are largely paid-off by the year 2020 and the 
end of year balance constantly rose until the year 2023 when the general public stakeholder 
chose to adjust passenger capacity by decreasing it 10%. In order to gain back general public 
interest, the airport stakeholder dramatically decreased fees resulting in a more than 
anticipated passenger capacity the next year. In 2024, airports lost close to $500M and re-
increased their fees during the last year in order to win the game. 
5.3.5.3 Corporate Airlines Stakeholder 
The corporate airlines stakeholder was represented by a formal airline employee who was 
able to provide accurate pricing strategies. In order to afford the large expenses mandated by 
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the FAA, the corporate airlines increased all of their fees throughout the game (Figure 5-7). One 
prominent observation that surfaced during the gaming exercise was the increase of ticket 
prices when the airline expenses are elevated. However, even when taxes are back to their 
normal values, one can see that the airlines did not reflect the relief in their fees, which is in 
accord with a real-world environment. Like the airports stakeholder, corporate airlines had to 
decrease their ticket fees when the general public stakeholder reacted and adjusted the 
passenger capacity. During that time, the raw ticket fee was decreased from $205 to $179; 
however it climbed back up to $209 once passenger capacity recovered. Throughout the game, 
passengers experienced a more than $50 increase in ticket prices ($377 compared to $325 in 
2010, after the government taxes are reflected). Baggage fees were increased from $25 to $31 
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Figure 5-7 Corporate Airlines Variables - Ticket Fees, Cancellation fees, and Baggage Fees 
Airline companies are highly susceptible to jet fuel price change due to heavy consumption, 
especially for the future capacity values reaching almost 3 times the current capacity. 
Examining Figure 5-8, it is apparent that the corporate airlines managed to keep their end of 
year balances on the positive. Although passenger capacity reached 240% of 2010 values and 
ticket prices were increased more than 15%, baggage fees more than 25%, and reservation fees 
more than 30%, corporate airlines still stayed below the profit margin level experienced at years 
2017 and 2019. Fuel prices and increased taxation values are found to be the main reason why 
















Figure 5-8 Corporate Airlines Financial Data vs. Capacity 
5.3.5.4 General Public Stakeholder 
As previously stated, the general public indirectly decides air travel passenger capacity at 
the end of each time-step by comparing the transit time and cost for the two predetermined 
routes. These one-way routes are the 228-mile Washington, DC (Union Station) to New York, NY 
(Penn Station) and 437-mile Washington, DC (Union Station) to Boston, MA (South Station) 
routes. As of March 2011, these two routes are the only two high speed rail routes existing in 
the United States ("Acela Express" by Amtrak35). The three modes of transportation considered 
are rail, automobile and air transportation. Air transportation values include travel time and 
costs -estimate of a taxi ride from the airports (Dulles International Airport, John F. Kennedy 
Airport, and Boston Logan Airport) to the rail stations (Union Station, Penn Station, and South 
35
 http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?c=AM Route C&pagename=am%2 
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Station). Other assumptions can be given as: an automobile with 25mpg, $3.113/gallon national 
gas average, arriving early to the departure airport, waiting for baggage at the destination 
airport and taxi transportation transit times. 
Figure 5-9 shows cost and transit times for the three modes of transportation with respect 
to the simulation year for the first configuration, from Washington, DC to New York. For this 
particular trip setup, driving is the lowest cost option; however, it takes over 4 hours and 30 
minutes. Flying is the costliest method of all; however, door-to-door transit time is higher than 
the high speed train option. With the introduction of future high speed rail systems, it is 
assumed that rail prices will rise in order to compensate for increased infrastructure 
investments while transit times will reach around 2 hours towards the end of the simulation. 
Meanwhile, air transportation cost increases throughout the game while transit times vary with 
the scenario: higher transit times during increased terrorist activities in the "Grounded" scenario 
and slower travel speeds to abide the tightened C02 regulations in the "Environmentally 
Challenged" scenario. Automobile transit times are assumed to be constant over the next 15 
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Figure 5-9 General Public Announcement Variables (Configuration 1) 
The second configuration variables are given in Figure 5-10. The pilot route for this setup is 
over 400 miles, rendering the automobile option rather obsolete due to transit times over 9 
hours, although the cost associated with automobile transportation is the lowest compared to 
the remaining two transportation modes. Similarly, due to increased travel distance, the train 
mode is not considerably cheaper than the air mode, but it is still much slower. The air 
transportation mode provides the fastest service with the highest cost until around the year 
2020 when High Speed Rail infrastructure starts to offer faster service times with increased 
ticket prices. In year 2023, with increased air transportation fees and the introduction of high 
speed rail, the general public stakeholder decides to adjust projected passenger capacity by -5% 
(Table 5-1). By the end of the simulation, transit times for air and train modes of transportation 
are comparable, and costs for both of the modes are on the rise. 
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Figure 5-10 General Public Announcement Variables (Configuration 2) 
The general public stakeholder participant adjusted air transportation capacity on six 
occasions throughout the game. These interventions are given in Table 5-1 Public Intervention 
Values and Provided Reasons. The 2015 terrorist attacks hamper air transportation capacity 
10% more than anticipated; however, even with the same terror risk, in the following year, the 
perceived terror risk is lower than projected. Even with the higher transportation costs and 
slower travel speeds, the air transportation mode still gets adjusted by the general public 
stakeholder and reaches 240% of the 2010 passenger capacity. This results in over 1.5 billion 
passengers in the NAS. 
Table 5-1 Public Intervention Values and Provided Reasons 
Year/Scenario _  ? 
?& T* ^ *' 
•gi, % ~i 
2014/ Pushing the Envelope 
2015/Grounded 
2022/ Environmentally Challenged 
mmm^m^mm^^ 















Strong U.S. Economy + relatively inexpensive air 
transportation fees 
Perceived terror risk higher than anticipated 
Ongoing perceived terror risk, lower than 
anticipated 
No increase on air transportation fees 
With upcoming High Speed Rail effect and the 
increase air transportation fees 
Passenger capacity increase in response to the 
steep decrease in air transportation fees 
following year 2023 
Continuing satisfaction from air transportation 
services 
5.1 Other Observations 
The following figures are plots from various variables, demonstrating the correlation 
between them. Figure 5-11 shows airline ticket fees versus capacity. The ongoing increase in 
ticket fees in 2023 resulted in a lack of passenger capacity increase, and the resulting price-cut 
from the airline companies allowed boosting the passenger capacity back up. 
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Figure 5-11 Airline Ticket fees vs. Capacity 
Figure 5-12 demonstrates the corporate airlines' budget change with respect to airport 
landing fees. In a majority of the years, these two values are inversely proportional; higher 
airport landing fees lead to lower airline end of year (or available balance) budget. The two 
peaks in the corporate airline available funds that can be examined in years 2017 and 2019 can 
be explained with relatively low airport landing fee charges of $6 and 13$ respectively. 
Similarly, the lowest airline profit margin was experienced at a very high landing fee of $25. 
Figure 5-14 shows the corporate airline budget versus ticket prices. Higher ticket prices lead to 
higher profit margins; however, airline companies are affected by a number of factors such as 
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Figure 5-12 Corporate Airlines Budget vs. Airport Landing Fee 
Figure 5-13 provides the corporate airline budget with respect to fuel prices. Although fuel 
prices only fluctuated below 5 cents, increased fuel prices drastically affected the airline budget 
given the volume of passenger transportation. Even with the elevated ticket prices in 2025, the 
airline stakeholder profit stayed well below the previous year's values. 
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Figure 5-14 Corporate Airlines Budget vs. Ticket Fees 
5.2 Enabler Acquisition Timeline and Surfaced Strategies 
The selected 18 enablers from 7 different categories are all implemented within the first 
three years of the game timeline. Since the participants of the game are real stakeholders within 
the aviation field, they were aware of the necessity of key enablers like ADS-B and Data Link, 
along with other safety related enablers (Table 5-2). For that reason, all the enabler acquisitions 
were completed by 2013 unlike other gaming sessions played with non-aviation related 
participants where the acquisition took place much later in the gaming session. One important 
outcome of the acquisition strategy was the leadership of the corporate airline participant. 
He/she was the initiator in purchasing high-dollar items such as ADS-B and Data Link. The cost 
of such enablers were collected by increased ticket fees and other fees charged by the airline 
companies. The corporate airline stakeholder compensated for the majority of the widespread 
application of ADS-B technology which is the main enabler for many NextGen technologies. The 
airport stakeholder provided a fraction of the technology acquisition (around 0.01%). The Data 
Link acquisition was realized by the government contribution, around 25% of the Data Link 
acquisition cost over the 11 years. 
Both airports and airlines also contributed to the UAS integration to the National Airspace. 
According to the scenario, from 2017 to 2021, airlines and airports were obligated to spare 
$75M and $150M, respectively. Overall, airport authorities spent $1.570B on enablers, $33M 
on ADS-B and $375M on UAS integration efforts, whereas airline authorities spared $2.316B on 
enablers, $5.896B on ADS-B and Data Link combined and $750M on UAS integration. 
Throughout the gaming activity, participants noted that after infrastructure investments 
are completed, increased passenger capacity allowed them to obtain large profit margins. 
However, if non-operational profit/expenses were included in the calculations, their profit 
would be considerably lower. Examining the past 10 years of aviation data, high fluctuations in 
the end-of-year balance are apparent due to severe fluctuations primarily in jet fuel prices. For 
purposes of simplicity, fuel prices were kept rather stable on February 14th, 2011 game (an 
increase of 4.5 cents). 
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Societies around the world depend on the proper functioning of various infrastructures. 
However, changes in technology, societal needs and expectations, political shifts, and 
environmental concerns cause infrastructure systems to underperform, requiring modernization 
(Roos, et al., 2004). Infrastructure system modernizations are performed to accommodate 
future capacity levels, address environmental concerns and meet sustainability needs. On the 
other hand, transformations of large-scale complex infrastructure systems create significant 
challenges. Their multi-dimensional complexity and increased societal contexts require different 
approaches to plan, design, and manage such transformations. In order to accurately plan next 
generation infrastructure systems, understating the interactions between technical, political and 
economic factors is of paramount importance and obtaining capabilities related to developing, 
evaluating and evolving infrastructure transformations accurately constitutes a fundamental 
need. 
In order to do so, the current research pursued the development and deployment of a 
gaming based methodology to serve as a platform to generate, integrate, and evaluate data for 
next generation infrastructure development efforts. To demonstrate its capabilities, the 
methodology was applied to the NextGen framework. The multi-dimensional complexity and 
stakeholder-rich environment of NextGen provided an accurate test bed for the complex socio-
technical system transformation. Subject matter expert opinions are used heavily to develop 
gaming components, constitute participants, and finally, evaluate the validity of the framework. 
The questionnaire provided in Appendix C was completed by participants via direct and indirect 
questions throughout the gaming exercise and debriefing as well as follow up contacts. 
6.1 Methodology Outcomes and Contributions 
The developed methodology presented in this dissertation allows decision makers to obtain 
several outcomes. The most important contribution of the methodology is related to the 
understanding and communication of complexity and interdependencies associated with large-
scale system transitions among stakeholders. For the unique cases where the participants are 
the actual stakeholders, improved knowledge of the system and awareness of its characteristics 
yields a desirable environment for data elicitation. Coupling gaming with other methods, the 
methodology can be applied to generate preliminary data regarding the systems' characteristics 
such as capacity, power generation, throughput, and risk evaluation/acceptance, while using a 
systemic approach, considering both social and technical aspects of the system. The 
methodology proposed within this dissertation can help generate and aggregate data for future 
status and transient phases of the infrastructure system transitions. The developed platform 
allows decision makers to test and validate scenarios while accommodating on-the-fly changes 
for adjustment and improvements from participants. 
The case study developed within this dissertation allowed decision makers to envisage NAS 
safety values over a 15-year transition period from the current to the future system visualized 
by a risk matrix and As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principle. The data generation 
session also revealed potential strategic behavior and pricing strategies. 
Although demonstrated using the NextGen transformation, the developed methodology 
can be applied to any large-scale infrastructure system thanks to its SoS approach and modular 
structure, allowing planners to employ existing tools and methods to the problem at hand. The 
gaming based methodology can be successfully adapted to any infrastructure system where 
large stakeholder interactions, multi-level complexities and high level interdependencies are 
present (e.g. energy infrastructure, information and telecommunications, emergency services, 
etc.). Depending on the need, the methodology can be followed to generate an application for 
scenario testing, preliminary system response predictions, simulating capacity and/or risk levels, 
prioritizing resources, identifying potential future issues (strategic behavior, public perception, 
etc.). 
6.2 Limitations of the Study 
Unlike computer models or other hard-science alternatives, the development, execution 
and validation phases of the methodology presented within this research require extensive 
subject matter expert contribution. For that reason, the gaming environment delineates the 
physical presence of all the prominent stakeholders of that particular infrastructure system on 
several occasions. It has proven quite difficult to identify, contact, and bring together all the 
experts and stakeholders under one roof throughout the development of the methodology 
mainly because of conflicting schedules and cost of travel. 
Besides logistics limitations, using serious gaming for academic research raises concerns 
due to challenges in validating the methodology. The interdisciplinary nature of simulation and 
gaming, in most cases, limits the use of this approach for educational/training purposes in 
businesses. Researchers believe that further work must be performed to theorize and establish 
serious gaming as a field of study; whether simulation and gaming is a beneficial tool or an 
academic field is still an uncertainty (Shiratori, 2003). However, in a more recent study, Mayer 
indicates the use of gaming as a serious research method yielding an increasing number of Ph.D. 
students over the last decade (Mayer, 2009). 
Also, the accurate representation of a large and complex system, fusing multiple 
perspectives and multiple disciplines, has proven challenging in practice (Brewer, 2007). For 
instance, the selection of scenario elements and the actual composition of the scenario are 
based primarily on the game developer's perspective and there is no rule for scenario 
development to guide game builders about what to include and what to omit (deLeon, 1975). 
Similar to the scenario construct, the abstraction of the elements of the reference system and 
translating them to the model poses a challenge. At any given time during the game 
development stage, it is crucial to iteratively check the assumptions against the reference 
system (Peters, et al., 1998). When developed properly, the plastic nature of gaming, allowing 
modelers to shape, bend, stretch and adapt to any problem at hand, was proven to be a great 
way of integrating the technical-physical complexity with social-political complexity, supporting 
the highly socio-technical and complex environment of next generation infrastructure 
development (Mayer, 2009). 
6.3 Future Work and Methodology Expansion 
Due to the characteristics of system-of-systems engineering methodology adopting a 
modular and flexible modeling environment, the current study has great potential for future 
expansion. The flexibility associated with the uses of a serious gaming platform enables the 
introduction of already existing risk assessment, cost analysis or other methodologies in order to 
investigate different aspects of the problem. For the cases where multi-stakeholder situations 
and complexity are a prominent part of the problem (which is believed the case on most large 
scale, complex systems), the developed methodology can be expanded to accommodate such 
needs. 
The future phases of the case study exercise can include other aspects of NextGen related 
technologies and methodologies besides the safety component. The increased capacity and 
respective environmental concerns induce more socio-economic problems that require 
investigation. Although this research adopted the passenger fatality as the primary 
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consequence indicator, other damage factors like accident related costs (damage to the aircraft, 
legal liabilities, etc.) or loss of reputation can also be included in the consequences scale of the 
risk definition. Also, additional capabilities can be brought into the data analysis and validation 
section of the methodology where the generated data can be used as a baseline for computer 
simulation models. It may be possible to limit dependence on expert and stakeholder 
participation; however, the feasibility of this approach must be further examined. 
Typically, developing a serious game takes one to two years, and there are cases where the 
game constantly gets updated and enhanced, taking over 6 years (Duke, 1980; Geurts, et al., 
2007; Mayer, 2009). Ensuring the seamless integration of the software and techniques covered 
in this methodology will take additional efforts and serious gaming exercises. 
Lastly, the methodology developed within this research can be applied to other large 
infrastructure transitions or other sociotechnical systems where strong stakeholder interactions 
occur, e.g. power or telecommunications infrastructures, national security, and healthcare. It is 
possible to experience and collect information regarding the counter-intuitive behavior of 
complex systems with methodologies harnessing the capabilities of both classical hard sciences 
and soft sciences alike, helping plan, develop and manage sustainable systems for generations 
to come. 
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APPENDIX A - UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION TO NATIONAL 
AIRSPACE 
A.l Introduction36 
A. l . l . Overview 
Over the past decade, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or unmanned aircraft systems UAS 
are used interchangeably throughout the text) have proven their values and capabilities via 
various applications around the globe. Initiated by the military, today UAVs are In high demand 
since they provide endurances and flight environments beyond the limits of manned systems. 
Civil government, scientific research institutes and commercial markets have already seized the 
low-cost, flexible, simple operation opportunities associated with UAV applications. However, 
barriers like lack of airspace regulations, airworthiness, safety, and standards applying to 
manned systems still remain the chief issues to address. Various initiatives are brought to life to 
support the creation and expansion of a civil/commercial UAV market, aiming to integrate 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). 
The problems associated with UAS integration into NAS are grouped under five general 
categories: safety, security, ATM, regulation, and socio-economic factors. Although UAS 
integration possesses case-specific issues such as public apprehension or consensus on UAS 
concepts of definitions, some of the technical issues like the lack of information data exchange 
networks or automated collision avoidance systems are within the NextGen framework. The 
majority of the NextGen enabling technologies inherently allow the seamless integration of UAS 
into NAS in the coming years. However, the socio-technical issues including regulations and 
public perception have to be addressed in order to achieve a fully integrated airspace 
(DeGarmo, 2004). 
A.l.2 Brief History and Integration Issues 
Since the 1950's, the U.S. military has spent more than $25 billion on UAS development. 
The 2006 Department of Defense Budget alone provided $1.7 billion for unmanned vehicles, 
including ground, underwater, aerial, and combat aerial unmanned vehicles (U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 2006). The U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense employed UAS 
in various scenarios, including Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, and 
Kosovo (DeGarmo, 2004; The U.S. Air Force, 2005; U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2003; 
Office of Secretary of Defense, 2005). The U.S. and other foreign armed forces continue to seek 
a more stable UAS development environment, eventually rendering the UAS one of the vital 
components of the military. As stated in U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2006), 
unmanned systems are considered to provide a major advantage to the U.S. forces on the 
36
 The goal of this section is to present an object-oriented based software approach to demonstrate 
the feasibility of accurately addressing the complexity of such an integration plan, while introducing the 
"business process" concept. 
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battlefield, while decreasing risks to troops by replacing the pilot with UAS on dull, dirty, or 
dangerous missions [8]. For these reasons, increased resources are committed to the acquisition 
and research of related UAS technologies worldwide37. 
Unlike underwater and terrestrial unmanned vehicles, a remotely piloted aircraft's 
operation area carries a high risk of interference with the National Airspace System (NAS). For 
this reason, current high altitude long endurance (HALE) UAS are highly restricted as to how, 
when, and where they can operate within NAS. Remotely operated aircraft (ROA) within the 
HALE class include Global Hawk, Predator B/Altair, Pathfinder, Helios, etc. and applications such 
as military reconnaissance, remote sensing, global disaster monitoring are demonstrated by the 
Department of Defense (DoD), NASA, and Department of Energy (DoE) (Bauer & Dann, 2005; 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). Since there is no regulatory or procedural 
guidance on how the unmanned aircraft operations are executed, these types of missions are 
considered "one time" events, treated as exceptional, requiring flight authorization on every 
single mission. Federal Aviation Administration issues a Certificate of Authorization (CoA) for 
HALE ROA, whose operational environment is similar to manned aircraft in order to maintain 
safety within NAS. CoA regulates the unmanned aircraft itself, pilot, operating and flight rules 
(Bauer & Dann, 2005). 
Although UAS capabilities have greatly excelled; the lack of UAS classification and standards 
still constitute the main roadblock before a fully integrated, safely operated National Airspace. 
Considering the various UAS sizes and configurations from the size of an insect to that of a 
commercial airliner, determining a universal UAS definition itself poses a great challenge (U.S. 
Congressional Research Service, 2003). The commercial and civil government market 
expectations have driven various initiatives, associations, and standard organizations to bring 
UAS operations inline with the manned operational environment and the ability to withstand 
any loads created through the commercial and civil government market. Examples of such 
associations, organizations, and initiatives are the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International (AUVSI), American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NASA), Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems (UVS) International, Access 5, and UAS National Industry Team (UNITE) 
(DeGarmo, 2004; Office of Secretary of Defense, 2007; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2008). 
Potential unmanned systems are prone to bringing more complexity and capacity issues to 
already saturated commercial airline markets and transportation infrastructure. Caused by 
The opportunities associated with UAVs are not only perceived by the military authorities; many 
commercial applications are sought, especially in the small aircraft market. Applications such as crop 
monitoring, communications relay, utility inspection, news and media support, aerial advertising, cargo, 
commercial imaging, and security, to name a few, are all potential UAV users, more economic and flexible 
than their space-based or manned aircraft counterfeits (DeGarmo, 2004). The civil government is 
considered to be one of the primary UAV user, particularly in homeland security. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) requested $10 million to support the Coast Guard and Border Patrol operations. 
DHS applications include watching coastal waters, patrol borders, protecting major oil and gas lines, drug 
surveillance, etc. Other civil applications cover traffic surveillance, emergency response, medical resupply, 
forest fire monitoring, flood mapping, nuclear/biological/chemical sensing and tracking, land use 
mapping, etc (DeGarmo, 2004; U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2003) 
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increased UAS flights, the air traffic will be affected via flight paths, performance criteria, and air 
services while labor disruptions will be created (DeGarmo, 2004). System interoperability, 
navigation, communications involving air traffic controllers and UAS are leading issues with air 
traffic aspects. According to the U.S. Military UAS flight data, unmanned systems have a poor 
safety record, almost two levels of magnitude (100 times) higher than risks associated with 
manned aircraft and 50 times higher than F-16 fighters (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 
2003). However, the high "mishap" (accident) rates are reconciled with the nature of military 
uses and low redundancy component failures. One other major concern is the lack of secure 
communication bandwidths required for UAS applications comprising the vehicle, ground 
control station, data link infrastructure and security (DeGarmo, 2004). Socio-economic factors 
including insurance liability, public acceptance, and government investment are other key 
components that actively drive and restrain future UAS markets. 
The undertaken challenges require insuring reliability, security, sustainability and 
affordability of the transformation and adaptation of the existing unmanned aircraft system 
(UAS) to NAS. As discussed previously, various initiatives are taken in order to obtain the desired 
integration state of unmanned aerial vehicles and NAS. DeGarmo (2004) provides an overview of 
the relevant issues under five main categories: safety, security, air traffic, regulation, socio-
economics. This section contains the primary findings of a project where the issues covered by 
DeGarmo (2004) are adopted and used on object-oriented paradigm based software as an input. 
The software is called TopEase® and handles problems as "business processes" and provides a 
desirable end-state of an enterprise, business, or an application while highlighting the gap 
between the desired and current states. The goal of the project was to demonstrate the 
preliminary feasibility of applying the UAS-NAS integration plan development to TopEase® 
environment with limited data on hand (mostly publicly available due to the sensitive material, 
(Bauer & Dann, 2005; DeGarmo, 2004; The U.S. Air Force, 2005). For this reason, at the time of 
writing, the results would be the preliminary confirmation from subject-matter experts 
according to the validity of the application. 
A.2 Object-Oriented Programming: An Overview 
A.2.1 An Overview 
The approach that has been followed during the project was based upon the TopEase® 
software which runs an object- oriented programming (OOP) paradigm in the background. The 
OOP paradigm uses "objects" to design applications and computer programs. Object-Oriented 
Modeling (OOM) may be seen as a collection of cooperating objects, as opposed to a traditional 
view in which a program may be seen as a list of instructions to the computer. The real system 
is modeled through the use of classes where each object acts like an independent entity with a 
distinct role or responsibility. OOP uses several concepts/techniques from previously 
established paradigms, including inheritance, modularity, polymorphism, and encapsulation 
supporting the development of efficient class structures. Key concepts are provided in the next 
section. 
A.2.2 Key Concepts 
• Class defines the abstract characteristics of a thing, including the thing's characteristics 
(its attributes or properties) and the things it can do (its behaviors or methods). 
• Object is a particular instance of a class and executable software representations of real-
world concepts and is a software package that includes ail the necessary data and 
procedures to represent a real-world object for a specific set of purposes. 
• Message Passing signifies the objects interacting with each other by sending requests 
for services known as messages. 
• Encapsulation is the mechanism by which related data and procedures are bound 
together within an object. It conceals the exact details of how a particular class works 
from objects that use its code or send messages to it. 
• Polymorphism is the behavior that varies depending on the class in which the behavior is 
invoked; that is, two or more classes can react differently to the same message. The 
power of polymorphism is that it greatly simplifies the logic of programs by shortening 
and increasing the execution speed. 
• Inheritance is the mechanism that allows classes to be defined as special cases, or 
subclasses, of each other (Gossain & Anderson, 1989; Pulfer & Schmid, 2006). 
A.2.3 TopEase® Software 
Once the OOP paradigm is understood, it is easier to place the objects, classes and message 
products throughout the software hierarchy. Unmanned aerial system (UAS) integration to NAS 
creates an interlinked and multidimensional challenge when the highly regulated air 
transportation infrastructure is taken into account, along with safety, security, air traffic, 
regulatory, and socio-economic aspects of the problem (DeGarmo, 2004). By defining the 
stakeholders, systems, subsystems, communications, regulations, processes, activities, etc. it 
creates a holistic view of the problem, with a structure that allows focusing on the details, 
limited only by the amount of information provided. TopEase® is commercially available object-
oriented-programming based software developed by Pulinco Engineering AG based in 
Switzerland38. The software has been used in various areas like banking, government sectors, 
solution providers, consulting firms, etc. The main page of the software is given in the following 
figure (Figure Al). 
TopEase was developed as a guide to help the managers understand the current status of the 
company and to predict its future development. For that reason, TopEase aims to provide the holistic 
view on the system to manage the complexity and obtain transparency when managing transformation 
and improvement processes Figure A2 shows TopEase's ability to provide a full-scale view of the system, 
successfully encompassing the visualization of the system complexity 
Fie E * Report BacuMMatkn Conttol Analysfc Took Options (%•>*> Help 
3 i * » B * % » • X W * • > « « , % % • • * « - ™ « . _ J [ 
« « g f " I A*. I m / « * # • * j • <* •« A A •> Y I 
"3* 
* CD Control yowbusnen 
S* Q Requrement 
Olnfluence 




CjVatue C h * 
* CD Reference 
QGlossary 
* O R H * Catalogue 
3 * . » " * * User* „*«»*$ MwJajfcj Rites 
UftrfifegMttrate-
The Leading solut ion for Business Process Management 
Enterprise Architecture and Corporate Development 
TopEase® Designer 
Operational Risk Management 
Multr Compliance Management 
Enterprise Performance Management 
Corporate Change Management 
On Demand Quality Management 


















Figure Al TopEase8 Main Screen 
Figure A2 TopEase8 providing insights on system complexity 
TopEase® software helps manage complex systems in transition from a current paradigm 
(initial state, or A) to an improved future paradigm (end state, or 8), called Gap Analysis. In the 
scope of the project, the current UAS operations status and a desirable future where unmanned 
systems can fly across the nation wi th similar safety, reliability, and ease to the commercial and 
military manned aircraft are taken as phases A and B, respectively. 
The Gap Analysis allows tracking of key performance parameters (risk, compliance with 
regulations, measurements against set goals, etc.) to measure progress. Along the integration, 
TopEase® keeps track of the current, past and desirable parameter values and monitors risk and 
other measurements. Since the end state, B, is not (cannot be) precisely defined by any 
authority, the object oriented paradigm behind the software allows flexibility for shaping the 
desired end-state and related transition states noted as Ti, T2, etc. (Figure A3) 
Decisions enabled by flight research 
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Figure A3 TopEase8 handling various transformation phases 
A.3 Methodology and Modeling of the Problem 
A.3.1 Business Process Approach 
TopEase® is largely developed for enterprise modeling, called a business approach, where it 
enables users to model their company/organization including the resource infrastructure, 
requirements, processes, activities, control flows, information models, etc. while the ultimate 
goal is to control compliance, improve performance and manage risks (Pulfer & Schmid, 2006). 
Based on the project definit ion, the UAS-NAS integration is modeled using limited literature and 
data coverage, mainly aimed to demonstrate the feasibility of the business process approach 
application to the matter at hand39. 
The attributes of OOP paradigm differ f rom any methods and tools in such a way that it 
allows obtaining descriptions and views (organization, process, workflow, etc.) of an enterprise 
The crucial point on using TopEase8 is due to its object oriented programming paradigm. The 
concept of the software is to introduce predefined artifacts to describe the enterprise in a specific time 
and situation. Each artifact has a behavior and is defined by several attributes which are identified 
depending on their usability. For example, the "collision avoidance" clause under the Safety process is 
modeled as activities and processes, enabling them to communicate with any other object in the model. 
On a similar manner, risk is defined as an object, via identifying various risk templates and applying it to 
any relevant area. 
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since all the views represent one single view and are not related to each other (Pulfer & Schmid, 
2006). TopEase® software enables full visualization of complex systems on one single "Big 
Picture". To illustrate that concept, a given UAS-NAS integration model can include the 
information from any physical room within the company infrastructure along with its connected 
IT network to the performance measurement history against a set of Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) regulations that the company is aiming to comply. This is possible due to 
the definition of OOP where every artifact is modeled as objects with their own specifications. 
The originality of this work lies within the application of the project contents to the object-
oriented paradigm based business approach. 
The processes, risk associated with the processes, organization schemes, compliances with 
FAA and other regulations, relationships between various processes and stakeholders, 
organizational departments, regulations, and measurement/risk templates that are modeled 
within the project are all based upon the literature coverage. 
A.3.2 Modeling Assumptions 
Due to the limited time and nature of the project, the unmanned aerial system to NAS 
integration model required some assumptions which will be presented in this section (The 
author of this dissertation was a prime investigator). Organizational structure is adopted from 
Bauer & Dann, (2005) where Access 5 is considered as the "actual" group dedicated to UAS-NAS 
integration where it is solely a research project/collaboration and one of the initiatives, involved 
with NASA and other stakeholders. Since TopEase® models the enterprise and assigns various 
processes and tasks to departments and personnel, it was necessary to inherit the 
organizational diagram from the reference to build the backbone of the model. The organization 
consists of five integrated product teams (IPTs); policy, technology, simulation, implementation, 
and flight test, forming the system engineering and integration team (SEIT). SEIT and Project 
control, facilitation and collaboration teams from the Access 5 project which is steered by NASA, 
DoD, FAA, and UAS National Industry Team and Vehicle Systems Program. 
Processes and activities are adopted directly from DeGarmo (2004) where safety, security, 
air traffic, regulation and socio-economic are five main processes, all containing three to nine 
processes, along with activities. Figure A4 demonstrates the main processes and processes. 
UAV - NAS 
Integration 
••(standards) 
Figure A4 UAV-NAS integration main processes and processes 
Risk data is taken from reference (DeGarmo, 2004). However, the information consists of 
only at the process level. As an example to risk data, the collision avoidance process risk is 
provided in Table A l . Each process risk is measured upon five criteria: safety criticality, technical 
complexity, legal complexity, socio-political risk, and economic cost. The five-point Likert scale 
(low, low-to-medium, medium, medium-to-high, and high) is transformed to TopEase® risk 
template and applied to all the processes. 
2.1.1. Collision 
Avoidance 










Low to High 
Considering the project layers, risk information is only available at the process level. Since 
every process contains various activities, the risk at that level is not provided by the references. 
Also, risk on a higher level (i.e. safety) is not available. TopEase® does not extrapolate nor 
calculate the risk on the higher project levels. Risk understanding of TopEase® is mainly for 
demonstration and tracking purposes, like any other information, risk data needs to be 
imported to TopEase® using other risk calculation or vulnerability determination engines. At the 
writing of this paper, TopEase® did not have an interface enabling risk calculation feature. 
The performance criteria, such as FAA requirements, regulations, or compliance with the 
socio-economic factors are extracted from reference (DeGarmo, 2004). The process-to-process, 
activity (process)-to-IPT teams, activity (process) - to - regulations and all other object-to-object 
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interrelationships (named work products under TopEase®) are investigated and created within 
the model, depending on the object's nature. 
A.4 The Outcomes 
The Big Picture: TopEase® enables users to see the highest-level picture of the meta-system, 
where every item is linked to lower-level information, only limited with the level of data entered 
to the model. By creating the diagram below (Figure A5), developers can examine the system 
and also have the liberty to focus in on any of the components, activities, processes or 
relationships to gather details regarding every aspect of the transition process. 
"_ i : , LTL-i, 
J M w | 
(Si?.; 
J *" J L 
Figure A5 Overview of the High-Level System Interactions 
On a lower-level diagram, it is possible to see the interactions, inputs and outputs, work 
products, overall risk associated with each process (color-coded) and links on the processes to 
reach activity level information. 
A.4.1 Visualization 
One of the most significant contributions of OOP based software usage is the modeling 
ease; however, TopEase® enables users to visualize the whole enterprise (or organization 
providing the service) from the highest possible project level to the section of a specific 
regulation including all the relationships within the enterprise. Figure A6 demonstrates the first 
process under the Air Traffic Management (ATM) main process, which is also called ATM. The 
level of detail is decreased for the purposes of this section; however, the structure given below 
can be seen at the highest (or lowest) level desired. The ATM process consists of 5 sub-
processes, all containing activities that can be accessed when clicked on the sub-process. The 
external agents or stakeholders imposing any regulations or requirements are DoD, DARPA, UAV 
National Industry Team and FAA. The stakeholder relationships are given as work products and 
are shown with connecting arrows. The diagram is completely interfaced to link at any part of 








Military UAV requirements 
Military UAV requirements I 
Civil Government UAV demands 
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UAV Communication Requirements 
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J Air Traffic Management 
Figure A6 Air Traffic Management process diagram and its interrelations 
A.4.2 Measurements 
Risk measurement can be documented in various ways. Risk maps, risk scorecards and 
automatically generated and updated risk documents help to keep track of ongoing risks 
throughout the big scope of the UAS-NAS integration. In a similar manner, other measurements 
such as process progress, compliance with regulations and requirements can also be visualized 
via measurement scorecards and measurement documents (Pulfer & Schmid, 2006). 
As the conventional methods and tools provide, the risk maps can be obtained through the 
TopEase® risk templates, constituting of the product of impact and likelihood. Figure A7 
demonstrates the risks associated with ATM processes. Besides the likelihood and impact, risk 
templates also include risk appetite (introducing the risk perception) and responsible, 
accountable, concerned, informed (RACI) parties. As all other diagrams, risk maps are 
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Figure A7 Risk Maps for ATM Processes 
Another method of demonstrating risk is through the risk scorecards. Figure A8 shows the 
risk level for each process under the ATM main process, including the last values. The 
measurement scorecards are flexible since they are attached to the templates that can be 
modified in the case where the "to be" description of the dynamic UAS-NAS transformation 
evolves through time. 
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Figure A8 ATM processes risk scorecard 
Compliance with the standards and meeting the changing requirements of various 
stakeholders are visualized with spider-web scorecards that enable past, current and target 
performance parameters. The business model concept provides strategies and goals for each 
process (or activity) that can be traced in terms of progress. Figure A9 and Figure AlO provide 
the overall process progress and risk scorecards for each element given in Figure A3. Various 
scorecards can be generated for every layer of the UAS-NAS integration plan, however, due to 
limited information in the scope of the project, only fictitious values are used for limited layers 
(Pulfer&Schmid, 2006). 
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Figure A9 Comprehensive Measurement Scorecard 
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Figure AlO Comprehensive Risk Scorecard 
Besides the risk and measurement visualization tools, TopEase® contains extensive 
reporting capability outputting to Word, Excel, or HTML formats. The responsibility, 
requirements, processes, and relationships matrices can also be developed. Once the enterprise 
infrastructure information is input into the model, it is possible to simulate and investigate the 
cascading effects of a service disruption (i.e. absent enterprise branch/person or non-
operational enterprise IT servers). For the UAS-NAS integration model, it is possible to replicate 
a case where the policy IPT fails to comply with one or multiple FAA regulations and visualize the 
various effects of the issue on other processes. 
A.5 Conclusions 
The advantages unmanned aerial systems provide will eventually require a fully integrated 
manned-unmanned National Airspace in the future. Like in the early ages of aviation, unmanned 
systems will mature and bring the same or even superior safety features that manned systems 
offer today. However, replacing pilots and crew on dangerous, dirty, and dull missions will 
necessitate an intensive planning, execution, and monitoring capability that can ensure a 
reliable, sustainable and efficient transition. Most of the technical issues associated with UAS-
NAS integration are already on the NextGen agenda, and issues associated with poor UAS 
reliability and lack of UAS classification schemes and definitions will be solved during the 
NextGen implementation plan. 
With limited resources, the UAS-NAS integration project was applied to an object oriented 
paradigm approach, and results were provided. As the approach taken is a type of "feasibility 
study" using TopEase®, the sole validation lies within the opinions of air traffic control (ATC) 
subject matter experts within the university staff. The approach is still under investigation and 
discussions will determine the possibility of an in-depth application in the future. The 
technological advances, cost containment, regulatory controls, public acceptance and numerous 
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other factors will determine the direction and strength of the UAS market. Since the prospects 
for UAS growth look promising, a dynamic, "big-picture" instrument capable of capturing the 
complexity of the integration is crucial for success. 
Future work involving the interfaces of various risk and vulnerability calculation tools will 
even bring more management and execution support for future efforts in UAS-NAS integration. 
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APPENDIX B - RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL 
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of an accident and its respective 
consequences. The methodology calculates probabilities and consequences separately (See 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1996). 
B.l Consequences 
The consequences of a certain accident are constructed with respect to the characteristics 
of the substance and its correcting factors regarding the area, population density, accident 
geometry, etc. 
Ca,s=AxSxfAxfdxfm 
Ca s Consequences per accident, and per substance (fatalities/accident) 
A The calculated area based on the various inputs based on each class and 
amount of substance 
° Population density within the impact area 
f f 
•> A Jd Correcting factors for the impact area geometry 
fm Correcting factor for the cases if people within the distance have shelter, 
opportunity to flee, or a way to find out about the event before it happens (e.g. warning from 
odor, tanks that explode one by one) 
Each component of the formula is entered from the existing tables where data is collected 
from extensive calculations, modeling, and expert opinions. The formula outputs a casualty 
number for each type of accident which will be matched with its respective probability of 
occurrence. 
B.2 Probabilities 
The probability of each substance installation (e.g. flammable liquid stored in a processing 
plant) is calculated via the following formula. The average probability number (used as a starting 
point) for each installation is determined by N*
 s and varies by each type of substance and 
installation. The rest of the components in the equation are used to adjust this initial estimation 
in the presence of various correcting factors. 
N„=N*ltS+nl+nf+n0+np 
Nis Probability number for an accident to happen for a substance within an 
installation 
N*
 s Average probabi l i ty number fo r the instal lat ion and the substance 
n, Correct ion parameter fo r the f requency of loading/unloading operat ions 
nf Correct ion parameter fo r the safety systems associated w i t h f lammable 
substances 
no Correct ion parameter fo r the organizat ional and management safety 
n Correction parameter for wind direction towards the populated area 
Based on the correction factors, the average N
 S value is recalculated and converted back 
into probability values based on the logarithmic relationship given above. In the same stream of 
thought, a similar approach is used to estimate the risks of transportation of hazardous 
substances, (Nt s ) . The formula and description are given below. 
Mtj=N*u+nc+nte+np 
N *,
 s Average probability number for the transport of the substance 
nc Correction parameter for the safety conditions of the transport system 
n
 R Correction parameter for the traffic density 
n. Correction parameter for wind direction towards the populated area 
B.3 Estimation of the Societal Risks 
The previous two sections provided calculations of human casualties (fatalities) associated 
with an accident, along with the probabilities of such accidents occurring. The risk to the public 
from these activities is estimated by combining these two values. 
Consequences are categorized with respect to fatalities, and the probability classes are 
categorized by one order of magnitude of the number of accidents per year. The results 
obtained from the consequence and probability calculations are represented on the risk matrix, 
providing an overall picture of the risk. The interpretation of the risk matrix provides the 
acceptability criteria for the societal risk. The thresholds for acceptable risks can be based on 
accident frequency (or probabilities) (Figure Bl), consequences (Figure B2), or a combination of 








Figure Bl Acceptability 




















Figure B2 Acceptability 
determined by consequences 
"relevant" 
Consequence 
Figure B3 Acceptability determined by both 
frequency and consequences 
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APPENDIX C - PARTICIPATION FEEDBACK & VALIDATION 
Validation Category 
Face Validity 
The game structure or outcomes "seem" 
to reproduce the reference system 
The theory and the assumptions on 
which the game was built can be shown 
isomorphic to the reference system 
Actor interactions, information flow, and 
negotiations are congruent to the 
reference system 
Structural Validity 
Individual constructs constituting the 
methodology 
Internal consistency of the way the 
constructs are put together in the 
method 
Appropriateness of the case study to be 
used to verify the performance of the 
method 
Performance Validity 
The results of the game are comparable 
to the results in reality 
The achieved usefulness is linked to 
applying the methodology 




i 2 3 4 5 
Overall representation of NAS is accurate 
Evaluation and ranking of the validity of the 
assumptions with respect to NAS 
Stakeholder relationships within NAS are 
comparable to the real world 
Serious Gaming, Rapid Risk Assessment 
Model, COTS Software (Logical Decisions) 
Contents of High 
Level Architecture (Figure 3.1) 
NAS as a multi-stakeholder and complex 
sociotechnical system transition platform 
NextGen 2025 Risk Values, Expected NAS 
future characteristics and stakeholder 
relationship representations 
Considering the holistic approach rather than 
conventional methods 
Any complex and large-sociotechnical system 
involving multiple stakeholders 
1- Totally Disagree, 
2- Somewhat Disagree 
3- Neither Agree or Disagree 
4- Somewhat Agree 
5- Totally Agree 
APPENDIX D - INSTUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB) APPROVAL DOCUMENTS 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
PROJECT TITLE: Avrat'On Safety Data Generation and Analysis Using Serious Gaming Methods 
INTRODUCTION 
The purposes of this form are to give you information that may affect your decision whether to say YES or NO to 
participation in this research, and to record the consent of those who say YES The research Aviation Safety Data 
Generation and Analysis Us.ng Serious Gaming Metnods' will be conducted in 4111 Monarch Way, Suite 406 in Norfolk, 
VA 
RESEARCHERS 
Researchers of this stucy are Dr Adrian V Gheorghe RP! {Professor Old Dominion University Batten College of 
Engineering Engineering Management and Systems Engineering Dept), Dr Sharon M Jones {Technical Monitor NASA 
Langley, Aeronaut.cs Systems Analysis Branch Systems Analysis ana Concepts Directorate) and Ersin Ancel, Graduate 
Research Assistant ("Old Dominion University, Batten College of Engineering, Engineering Management and Systems 
Engineering Dept) 
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH STUDY 
The research study aims to generate data for future aviation systems Corventonal expert elicitation methods are found 
to be successful m generat.ng data for complex technical systems (e g data generation for a conceptual launch vehicle) 
However, data regarding complex sociotechnical systems with multiple components (eg National Arspace System 
comprised of technical, political social and organizational aspects) are rather difficult to obtain with the conventional 
expert el citation methods (Branstorming, Delphi Methods, Nominal Group Technique, etc) For that purpose serious 
gaming methods are proposed to be used in tandem with other conventional techniques to generate data for futu-e 
systems This research study aims to test the proposed oiatfo-m and gererate initial data for further improvements 
If you decide to participate, then you will ,oin a study involving a role-playing environment You will be asked to represent 
a certain role in the National Airspace System. Your task wit, be to interact with other players of the game in order to 
review, discuss and decide on future aviation systems Researcners will contact you with n one week of the exercise to 
provide you with the pre iminary results and ask for your input/comments or the research methodology or the results if 
you say YES. then your participat.on will last up to 4 hours at Old Dominion University National Centers for System of 
Systems Engineering (NCSOSE), 4111 Monarch Way Suite 406, Norfolk VA Approximately 20 to 25 participants from 
various backgrounds will be participating in this study 
EXCLUSIONARY CRITERIA 
You received the invitation to participate in this study given your current or past experience with aviation in the National 
Airspace System (e g researches pilot, airport operations, etc j or to be representative of the general pub.ic You should 
be over the age of 18 to oarticipate in this study 
RISKS AND BENEFITS 
RISKS Tne sole perceivable risk in this study is the loss of confidentiality If you decide to participate in th s study, you 
will be asked to discuss your ideas and engage in conversations with other participants These discussions and outcomes 
will be noted However in order to min.mize the risks, the researchers wu. remove al, link.ng identifiers from the extractec 
data Yours and your company s information will not be stored on any database or file cabinet Ard as with any research 
there is some possibility that you may be subject to risks that have not yet been identified 
Benefits There are no airect benefits to yo^ in participating in this study 
COSTS AND PAYMENTS 
Your oarticlpation in this study is absoluteiy voluntary. The researchers are unable to give you any payment for 
participating in this study However snacks anc refreshments will be provided tnroughout the study 
NEW INFORMATION 
If the researchers find new information during this study that would reasonably change your decision about participating 
then they will give it to you 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The researchers wll take reasonable steps to keep private information, such as individual opinions, discussions and 
aersonal information 'eiated to you or your employer confidential The 'esearchers will remove identifiers from the 
rformation store information in a lockec filing cabinet and a secure electronic database prior to its processing. The 
results of this study may be used in reports presenta; ons, and publications but the researcher <ivill not identify you or 
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 The contents of this appendix includes the IRB documents that were generated following the 
review process, including the Informed consent document and audio/video documentation 
your employer. Of course, your records may be subpoenaed by court order or inspected by government bodies with 
oversight authority. 
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE 
It is OK for you to say NO. Even if you say YES now, you are free to say NO later, and walk away or withdraw from the 
study - at any time. Your decision will not affect your relationship with Old Dominion University/NASA Langley, or 
otherwise cause a loss of benefits to which you might otherwise be entitled. 
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 
If you say YES. then your consent in this document does not waive any of your legal rights. However, in the event of 
harm arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University nor the researchers are able to give you any money, 
insurance coverage, free medical care, or any other compensation for such injury. In the event that you suffer injury as a 
result of participation in any research project, you may contact the responsible principal investigator or investigators at the 
following phone numbers or Dr. George Maihafer the current IRB chair at 757-683-4520 at Old Dominion University, who 
will be glad to review the matter with you. 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read this form or have had it read to 
you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, tne research study, and its risks and benefits The researchers 
should have answered any questions you may have had about the research. If you have any questions later on, then the 
researchers should be able to answer them: 
Dr. Adrian Gheorghe (Principal Investigator) 757-277-6280 agheorgh@odu.edu 
Dr. Sharon M. Jones {Technical Monitor) 757-864-7642 sharon m.jones@nasa.gov 
Ersin Ancel (Graduate Research Assistant) 757-272-2364 eance001@odu.edu 
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your rights or this form, then you should 
call Dr. George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 757-683-4520, or the Old Dominion University Office of Research, at 
757-683-3460. 
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to participate in this study. The 
researcher should give you a copy of this form for your records. 
Subject's Printed Name & Signature Date 
INVESTIGATOR'S STATEMENT 
I certify that I have explained to this subject the nature and purpose of this research, including benefits, risks, costs, and 
any experimental procedures. I have describee the rights and protections afforded to human subjects and have done 
nothing to pressure, coerce, or falsely entice this subject into participating. I am aware of my obligations under state and 
federal laws, and promise compliance. I have answered the subject's questions and have encouraged him/her to ask 




TO Adriar Gheorghe PhD 
Responsible Project Investigator 
FROM George Maihafer PT PhD . ) ' . ' « / . > ' ; * £ > 
Chairperson, IRB ' / 
RE Addendum Request to "Using Serious Gaming for Next Generation 
Infrastructure Data Elicitation ( ODU IRB # 10 - 157) 
DATF- Febiuar> 3.2011 
After review of the amended revisions to ODU IRB # 1 0 - 5 7 "Using Serious 
Gaming for Next Generation Infrastructure Data Elicitation", I approve the 
change in an expedited review manner. The amendment to the methodology of 
the study is as follows 
The addition of a consent for photo/video materials to the study 
A Progress report or Close out Report will be required one year from the original 
approval date (November, 2011) of the study application to the Old Dominion 
University Institutional Review Board Please let me know if I can be of any 
further assistance 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
FOR USE OF PHOTOAflDEO MATERIALS 
STUDY TITLE: Aviation Safety Data Generation and Analysis Using Serious Gaming Methods 
DESCRIPTION: 
The researchers would also like to take photographs or videotapes of you performing the serious 
gaming activity in order to illustrate the research in teaching presentations and/or or publications 
CONFIDENTIALITY: 
The photo/video materials will be used to extract any additional information that reveals during the 
gaming session All matena! will be recorded and stored electronically in Old Dominion University's 
secure servers for a penod of 12 months You would not be identified by name in any use of the 
photographs or videotapes Even if you agree to be in the study no photographs or videotapes will be 
taken of you unless you specifically agree to this 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
By signing below, you are granting to the researchers the right to use your likeness image 
appearance and performance - whether recorded on or transferred to videotape film slides 
photographs - for presenting or publishing this research No use of photos or video images will be 
made other than for professional presentations or publications The researchers are unable to 
provide any monetary compensation for use of these materials You can withdraw your voluntary 
consent at any time 
If you have any questions later on then the researchers should be able to answer them 
Dr Adrian Gheorghe (Principal Investigator) 757-277-6280 agheorgh@odu edu 
Dr Sharon M Jones (Technical Monitor) 757-864-7642 Sharon m jones@nasa gov 
Ersin Ancel (Graduate Research Assistant) 757-272-2364 eance001@odu edu 
If at any time you feel pressured to participate or if you have any questions about your rights or this 
form, then you should call Dr George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 757-683-4520, or the Old 
Dominion University Office of Research at 757 683 3460 
Subject's Printed Name & Signature Date 
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[C2] 
Loss of Separation 
(Separation 
Assurance) 
nd Loss of Separation 
Enabler 
TCAS Enhancements 
ADS-B, TIS-B, FIS-B, 
Wide Area 
Augmentation 
System for GPS 
Addresses 









50% of collision 
related incidents 




(JPDO, 2008b, V1.0 p.9) 









































FIS-B, Data Link, (JPDO, 
2008a: Weather 
Forecasts - Consolidated 
Winter Storm JPDO, 
2008A Appendix I I -
p.82), Integrated 
Weather In the Cockpit 
(DoT, 2011a A12E, p. 
RE&D-134) 
Consolidated Winter Storm NextGen 
initial(l), intermediate (2) and fully 50% of 
operational (3) predictive models Thunderstorm 
and current weather observation related 
Information to users via Network accidents 
Enabled Infrastructure 
Level 1( Initial 
Capability):2013 
Level 2 (Adaptive 
Control/Enhanced 
Forecast): 2018 
Level 3 (Full NextGen): 
2022 





















Enhanced accuracy of net-enabled 
deterministic and advanced 
probabilistic weather forecast 
information for NAS decision making. 70% of CFIT due 
Level 2022 integrates weather to low visibility 
information from ground, airborne, 


























In Flight Turbulence 
Encounter 
[TURB] 
FLI (Forward Looking 
Interferometric) 
[IIFD.SS.1J 
Detects clear air 
turbulence (CAT) 

















Database, Aircraft Wake 
Database, 
Wake Transport Model 
Wake Decay Model 
Wind Based Wake 
Procedures 
Reduce the impact 
of wake vortices on 
operations, allowing 
more closely spaced 





90% reduction in 
Ground Wake 
related accidents 
Level 1: 2015 
Level 2:2020 
(JPDO, 2008A App 
IOI-0400-401-
402-403) 
$3,000,000 (FAA Wake 
Turbulence (Re-
categorization)) 









APPENDIX F - CAST/ICAO COMMON TAXONOMY TEAM ACCIDENT CATEGORIES 
AND DATA 
Table Fl outlines the data regarding selected accident categories associated with FAR Part 
121 during 1997 and 2006, providing the historical safety risk among large U.S. commercial air 
carriers. The percentages for each primary accident category are based on the Commercial 
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) taxonomies. 
However, regarding the two categories regarding the airborne collision category (CI and C2), 
due to the extreme nature of such accidents occurring, incident data were assumed to replace 
accident data for consistency purposes. 
Table-Fl Accident Categories and Respective Data 




Ground Collision - Ramp 
TCAS Alert 
Loss of Separation (includes 
NMAC) 
Mid Air Collision 
SCF - Powerplant 
SCF - Structure 
SCF - Systems 
Icing - Engine 



























































































Loss of Control - In Flight 
Loss of Control - On Ground 




















Table F2 provides the NTSB accident data for the past 10 years, (2000 - 2009) . The 
average accident values (0.208 Accidents/100,0O0FH) and average fatalities (0.291 
Fatalities/100,000FH) are used as the baseline values for probability and consequences 
baselines within the probability number method. The 2001 values are adjusted in order to 
exclude the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks resulted in 4 fatal accidents with 246 
casualties, and these values are subtracted from the original accident data values. The original 
(adjusted) values are as follows: 46 (42), 6 (2), 525 (279). 





































































































Table 3 above provides the accident categories that are covered within the probability 
number method, and it totals 76.5% of the accidents given in the table. The total actual accident 
reduction in each category (assumed the respective technologies are fully implemented) 
reaches 61.45% of the total accidents covered within the 6 major categories. 
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table5.htm 
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